Change in Hamiltonian General Relativity from the Lack of a Time-like
  Killing Vector Field by Pitts, J. Brian
ar
X
iv
:1
40
6.
26
65
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.hi
st-
ph
]  
7 J
un
 20
14
Change in Hamiltonian General Relativity from the Lack of a
Time-like Killing Vector Field∗
J. Brian Pitts
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge
jbp25@cam.ac.uk
23 May 2014
Abstract
In General Relativity in Hamiltonian form, change has seemed to be missing, defined only asymptot-
ically, or otherwise obscured at best, because the Hamiltonian is a sum of first-class constraints and a
boundary term and thus supposedly generates gauge transformations. Attention to the gauge generator
G of Rosenfeld, Anderson, Bergmann, Castellani et al., a specially tuned sum of first-class constraints,
facilitates seeing that a solitary first-class constraint in fact generates not a gauge transformation, but a
bad physical change in electromagnetism (changing the electric field) or General Relativity. The change
spoils the Lagrangian constraints, Gauss’s law or the Gauss-Codazzi relations describing embedding of
space into space-time, in terms of the physically relevant velocities rather than auxiliary canonical mo-
menta. While Maudlin and Healey have defended change in GR much as G. E. Moore resisted skepticism,
there remains a need to exhibit the technical flaws in the no-change argument.
Insistence on Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence, a theme emphasized by Mukunda, Castellani,
Sugano, Pons, Salisbury, Shepley and Sundermeyer among others, holds the key. Taking objective
change to be ineliminable time dependence, one recalls that there is change in vacuum GR just in case
there is no time-like vector field ξα satisfying Killing’s equation £ξgµν = 0, because then there exists no
coordinate system such that everything is independent of time. Throwing away the spatial dependence
of GR for convenience, one finds explicitly that the time evolution from Hamilton’s equations is real
change just when there is no time-like Killing vector. The inclusion of a massive scalar field is simple. No
obstruction is expected in including spatial dependence and coupling more general matter fields. Hence
change is real and local even in the Hamiltonian formalism.
The considerations here resolve the Earman-Maudlin standoff over change in Hamiltonian General
Relativity: the Hamiltonian formalism is helpful, and, suitably reformed, it does not have absurd conse-
quences for change. Hence the classical problem of time is resolved, apart from the issue of observables,
for which the solution is outlined. The Lagrangian-equivalent Hamiltonian analysis of change in General
Relativity is compared to Belot and Earman’s treatment. The more serious quantum problem of time,
however, is not automatically resolved due to issues of quantum constraint imposition.
Keywords: constrained Hamiltonian dynamics, General Relativity, problem of time, quantum gravity,
variational principles
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1 Introduction
1.1 Hamiltonian Change Seems Missing but Lagrangian Change Is Not
It has been argued that General Relativity, at least in Hamiltonian form, lacks change, has change only
asymptotically and hence only for certain topologies, or appears to lack change with no clear answer
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in sight (e.g., (Anderson, 1962a; Isham, 1993; Belot and Earman, 2001; Earman, 2002; Rickles, 2006;
Huggett et al., 2013)). Such a conclusion calls to mind earlier philosophical puzzles, whether ancient
(the paradoxes of Zeno, whom James Anderson mentions (Anderson, 1962b; Anderson, 1962a), and the
views of Parmenides, whom Kucharˇ mentions (Kucharˇ, 1993)) or modern (the argument concluding that
real time requires something contradictory and hence is impossible by McTaggart (McTaggart, 1908),
mentioned in a memorable philosophical exchange (Earman, 2002; Maudlin, 2002)). The new conclusion,
following apparently with mathematical rigor from our standard theory of gravity, is not as readily ignored
as Zeno, Parmenides and McTaggart. On the other hand, if one breathes the fresh, clean air of numerical
relativity from time to time, it is difficult not to notice that there really is change in GR. Thus one might
suspect that any formal Hamiltonian results to the contrary are mistaken. Such a conclusion is all the
clearer if one recalls that the Lagrangian GR formalism and 4-dimensional differential geometry are not
thought to have any analogous problem. Either the canonical standards are inappropriately strict, or
the 4-dimensional Lagrangian standards are too loose. But no one thinks the latter.
The Earman-Maudlin philosophical exchange provides a good starting point (Earman, 2002;
Maudlin, 2002). Maudlin displays liberal amounts of common sense about point individuation, ob-
servables (in the non-technical sense of what can be observed), etc., whereas Earman displays standard
glosses on standard mathematical physics. Neither common sense rooted in scientific practice nor a com-
mon interpretation of mathematical physics is to be taken lightly, but can one have both? Is there a point
in which mathematical physics becomes so bizarre as to undermine itself by excluding grounds for any
possible empirical confirmation (Healey, 2002)? Earman has elsewhere composed an “Ode” commending
the Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics formalism to philosophers (Earman, 2003). The reader of the
Earman-Maudlin exchange gets the impression that each side declares victory. The progress of physics
has been so great, and often enough counterintuitive, that beating back Poisson brackets with appeals
to common sense does not yield full conviction, and rightly so. If Earman unwittingly exhibits “How
to Abuse Gauge Freedom to Generate Metaphysical Monstrosities,” as Maudlin’s subtitle claims, then
what is the right way to handle gauge freedom? On this question Maudlin is less full than one would
prefer. Ultimately I will side with Maudlin’s common-sense conclusions, though not his dismissive view
of the Hamiltonian formalism. Change will be defended not in defiance of or indifference to mathemat-
ical physics, but through careful engagement in it and reform motivated by more solid mathematical
physics—in line with Maudlin’s invocation of the gold standard formulation of GR in terms of Einstein’s
equations and 4-dimensional differential geometry.
1.2 Maudlin’s and Healey’s Critiques in G. E. Moore’s Style
One could affirm real change in GR without attending at all to arguments about the Hamiltonian formal-
ism, because nothing about the Hamiltonian formalism’s treatment of change could be more decisive than
the meaning of the presence or absence of a time-like Killing vector. This claim bears a resemblance to
the response to skepticism by G. E. Moore (Moore, 1939), as well as the spirit of Maudlin’s and Healey’s
responses to Earman (Maudlin, 2002; Healey, 2002). But the Moorean-like fact, in my view, is not (or
not only) some deliverance of common sense, accessible by simple bodily gestures (Moore’s displaying his
hands, Samuel Johnson’s kicking a stone), but rather (or also), a deliverance of Lagrangian field theory.
Yet this is no justification for dismissing the Hamiltonian formalism. It is, rather, a call for reform.
The necessity and incompleteness of such an approach resembles Norman Malcolm’s discussion of
Moore’s philosophy1:
Two things may be said against Moore’s method of refutation. (Footnote: This must be taken
as qualifying my previous statement that Moore’s refutations are good ones.) In the first place,
it often fails to convince the author of the paradox that he is wrong.. . . In the second place,
Moore’s style of refutation does not get at the sources of the philosophical troubles which
1I owe this reference to Jim Weatherall.
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produce the paradoxes.. . . Although Moore’s philosophical method is an incomplete method,
it is the essential first step in a complete method. The way to treat a philosophical paradox is
first of all to resist it, to prove it false. Because, if the philosopher is pleased with his paradox,
fancies it to be true, then you can do nothing with him. It is only when he is dissatisfied with
his paradox, feels refuted, that it is possible to clear up for him the philosophical problem of
which his paradox is a manifestation. (Malcolm, 1968, pp. 366-367)
If Malcolm’s praise seems too strong (because Moorean anti-skeptical arguments are not always necessary
and not always good), the point remains that Moore-style arguments such as Maudlin’s and Healey’s
are sometimes good, incomplete, and yet inspirational unraveling a flawed skeptical argument, as is the
case here. The considerations presented above largely fill the gap left by the Moorean style of defense of
change in GR.
2 Lagrangian Interpretive Strategy Brings Clarity
Attending to the Lagrangian formalism of General Relativity and to 4-dimensional differential geometry
holds the key to clarity in all these matters. It seems to be widely agreed on diverse grounds that the
Lagrangian formulation of mechanics (broadly construed) is more fundamental than the Hamiltonian one
(Gotay and Nester, 1979; Curiel, 2014).2 It is also widely believed that the two are equivalent (apart
perhaps from topological restrictions), or at least that they should be. Yet there are controversies
in the literature on constrained dynamics about whether such equivalence actually holds, and various
proofs presented have too narrow a scope (such as addressing the equivalence of equations of motion but
neglecting to address the equivalence of the gauge transformations). One possible view is described by
Pons, Salisbury and Sundermeyer (Pons et al., 2010):
[t]he position on one side is that there ought to be no debate at all [about the physical
interpretation of General Relativity or any generally covariant theory] because the phase
space formalism is equivalent to the formalism in configuration-velocity space, and no one has
claimed that any interpretational problem exists in the latter framework. Entire books have
been devoted to the experimental tests of GR, and this very language implies that observables
exist - alive and kicking. Thus the entire debate must be a consequence of misunderstandings.
(Pons et al., 2010, p. 3).
Such a view suggests a Lagrangian-first interpretive strategy.
This view does not seem to be the view of Kucharˇ, though he, very unusually, is willing to tinker with
the Dirac-Bergmann formalism to uncover real change in General Relativity (Kucharˇ, 1993). Kucharˇ’s
reinterpretation of the Hamiltonian constraint is not systematic—the common-sense arguments about
observing temporal change work equally well for the momentum constraint and spatial change. Neither
is Kucharˇ’s view clearly inspired by the need for equivalence with the Lagrangian formalism. He allows
that observables should commute with the momentum constraint Hi, because we cannot directly observe
spatial points. But he denies that observables should commute with the Hamiltonian constraint H0. He
notes that one cannot directly observe which hypersurface one is on, either—which provides pressure
to think that observables should commute with the Hamiltonian constraint. But he does not treat the
constraints even-handedly despite their fitting his argument-form equally well:
2There is, to be sure, a Hamiltonian derivation of geometrodynamics (Hojman et al., 1976). Whether one can seriously
imagine someone first finding GR by that means is another matter. One risk of a freestanding Hamiltonian view is the temptation
(resisted by these authors but not others) to forget that one only learns what the canonical momenta mean physically by virtue
of the equations q˙ = δH
δp
. By contrast the Lagrangian lacks those a priori physically meaningless dynamical quantities. That
is one clear respect in which the Lagrangian formalism is more fundamental than the Hamiltonian. For such reasons, it is best
to direct one’s thoughts to the Hamiltonian action
∫
dt(pq˙ −H) rather than the Hamiltonian itself.
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However, the collection of the canonical data g(1), p(1) on the first hypersurface is clearly
distinguishable from the collection g(2), p(2) of the evolved data on the second hypersurface.
If we could not distinguish those two sets of the data, we would never be able to observe
dynamical evolution. (Kucharˇ, 1993, p. 137)
Indeed so. But who makes observations over an entire space-like hypersurface? We observe that the world
is spatially varying, so, by parity of reasoning, why should observables commute with the momentum
constraint Hi, either? Hence making his argument more consistent provides a reason to doubt that
observables should commute with the Hamiltonian or momentum constraints. One could also note that
neither H0 by itself nor Hi actually generates a gauge transformation due to neglect of the lapse and
shift vector, basically the part of the space-time metric that is not contained in the spatial metric.
Kucharˇ’s common-sense remarks on what experimental physicists routinely observe and Maudlin’s
common-sense remarks about observables point in the same direction. But the view described isn’t quite
that view of Maudlin, either (Maudlin, 2002). While Maudlin is satisfied with the Lagrangian formalism
and its implicit concept of observables in terms of tensor calculus, he takes the problems in Hamiltonian
General Relativity as a reason to reject it, not to reform it. Such a response is both unnecessarily drastic
and incompatible with regarding the phase space formalism as equivalent to the configuration-velocity
formalism.
The view described above by Pons, Salisbury and Sundermeyer (Pons et al., 2010) is attractive, if
suitably developed to reform the Dirac-Bergmann formalism to achieve Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equiva-
lence, and is adopted here. A principled way to implement the common sense that Kucharˇ and Maudlin
forcefully deploy is to apply consistently the standards of observability/physical reality in Lagrangian/4-
dimensional GR, where tensor fields (if not hobbled by other gauge freedoms like electromagnetism) are
observable. Something like this view is implicit in the Pons-Salisbury-Shepley-Sundermeyer principles of
reforming the Dirac-Bergmann formalism to ensure Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence and paying due
attention to the gauge generator G (Anderson and Bergmann, 1951; Castellani, 1982). One can take as a
motto a remark of Pons and Shepley that has characterized that series of works (e.g., (Pons et al., 1997;
Shepley et al., 2000; Pons and Salisbury, 2005; Pons and Shepley, 1998)):
We have been guided by the principle that the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formalisms should
be equivalent. . . in coming to the conclusion that they in fact are. (Pons and Shepley, 1998,
p. 17)
Indeed one can hardly do otherwise in constrained dynamics without falling into inconsistency or error.
But such an innocuous principle, they have shown, has unappreciated consequences that yield greater
conceptual clarity. In this paper I aim to push further, primarily on conceptual rather than technical
matters, in the same direction. The descriptive claim that the q-p formalism is equivalent to the q-q˙
formalism is too quick; that equivalence should hold, but work has been needed to make it hold.
2.1 Taproot of Confusion: First-Class Constraints and Gauge Trans-
formations
Indeed still more work is needed to make the q-p formalism equivalent to the q-q˙ formalism. Recently I
showed that if one accepts the longstanding claim that a first-class constraint generates a gauge trans-
formation, then one spoils Gauss’s law, the Lagrangian q-q˙ constraint ∇ · ~E = 0 in (vacuum) electro-
magnetism (Pitts, 2013). The electric field, a familiar function of the derivatives of the potentials Aµ
(Jackson, 1975), changes by the gradient of the arbitrary smearing function and hence ceases to be di-
vergenceless even in the absence of charge. It is easy not to notice this problem because the conjugate
momentum that one expected to be the electric field, remains divergenceless. If one isn’t careful to retain
Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence, the conjugate momenta can cease to mean what one expected, as
Anderson and Bergmann pointed out long ago (Anderson and Bergmann, 1951).
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To see the problem, one can add the two independently smeared constraints’ actions together:
δAµ(x) = {Aµ(x),
∫
d3y[p0(y)ξ(t, y) + pi,i (y)ǫ(t, y)]} = δ0µξ − δiµ∂iǫ. (1)
Then one calculates the 4-dimensional curl of the transformed 4-vector potential less the curl of the
original potential, getting the curl of the gauge transformation due to linearity. (The fact that the
electric field itself is not defined on phase space is not relevant. Once one knows Aµ, one can take its curl
to find the electromagnetic field.) The magnetic field is unchanged (Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 134). But
the electric field, which curiously has been neglected, does change (Pitts, 2013)—a result that dashes
expectations that a first-class constraint alone generate a gauge transformation. The combined change
in ~E is given by
δF0n = −δ ~E = −∂nξ − ∂n∂0ǫ. (2)
If one puts the constraints to work together as a team by setting ξ = −ǫ˙ to make the δF0n = 0, then
δAµ(x) = {Aµ(x),
∫
d3y[−p0(y)ǫ˙(t, y) + pi,i (y)ǫ(t, y)]} = −δ0µǫ˙− δiµ∂iǫ = −∂µǫ, (3)
which is good. Not surprisingly in light of the form of the gauge generator
(Anderson and Bergmann, 1951; Castellani, 1982; Pons et al., 2000)
G =
∫
d3x(pi,i ǫ − p0ǫ˙), (4)
p0 and pi,i generate compensating changes in ~E when suitably combined. Indeed one can piece together G
by demanding that the changes in ~E cancel out. Two wrongs, with opposite signs and time differentiation,
make a right. This tuning, not surprisingly, is a special case of what Sundermeyer found necessary
to get first-class transformations to combine suitably to get the familiar gauge transformation for the
potentials for Yang-Mills (Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 168). The benefit of my taking the curl before fixing
the coefficients of the constraints to make a team is to show that getting the usual Lagrangian gauge
transformations is compulsory on pain of spoiling elementary facts of electromagnetism, not merely
optional and comfortingly familiar as it has seemed to be in the constrained dynamics literature. The
commutative diagram makes the point.
Aµ
L−equiv.−−−−−−→ G = ∫ d3x(−p0ǫ˙+ ǫpi,i ) −−−−→ δAµ = −∂µǫ
∫
d3x(p0ξ+ǫpi,i)
y
ycurl
δAµ = δ
0
µξ − δiµǫ,i curl−−−−→ δFµν = (δ0νξ,µ−δiνǫ,iµ )− µ↔ ν L−equiv.−−−−−−→
ξ=−ǫ˙
δFµν = 0
While the top line is not unknown in works advocating Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence, the bottom
line appears to be novel. It is of course unacceptable to have δFµν 6= 0, so requiring Lagrangian equiv-
alence from the Hamiltonian resolves the trouble. Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence is the law, not
just a good idea.
The equality (up to a sign) of the electric field and the momentum pi conjugate to Ai using Hamilton’s
equations
A˙i =
δH
δpi
has tempted many authors to treat that equality as if it were something stronger. These are among
the boring Hamilton’s equations, ones that recover what one already knew in the Lagrangian context
and then forgot in performing the Legendre transformation. Boring or not, that relationship must be
forgotten in calculating Poisson brackets. Some authors, far from forgetting that equality, even use the
letter E for the canonical momentum, reflecting in notation an overly hasty identification that is often
less transparently made (Faddeev, 1982; Belot and Earman, 2001). But that canonical momentum is no
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longer equivalent to the electric field after either first-class constraint has acted on Aµ. Likewise, one spoils
the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints in GR—at least the physically relevant versions, which are in
terms of q and q˙ (the 3-metric, lapse, shift vector, and extrinsic curvature tensor, roughly) and pertain to
intrinsic curvature and the embedding of space into space-time, not q and off-shell physically meaningless
canonical momenta πij by acting with a primary first-class constraint or a secondary first-class constraint.
Hence a first-class constraint in these representative theories, whether primary or secondary, generates a
bad physical change, not a gauge transformation. Conjugate momenta don’t ultimately matter; they (at
least the unconstrained ones) are just auxiliary fields for making q˙ (and hence q) do the right thing over
time. Being auxiliary fields, they appear essentially algebraically in the canonical action∫
dtd3x(pq˙ −H)
and can be ‘eliminated’ (reduced to functions of derivatives of Aµ in physically possible worlds) using their
own equations of motion, leading back to the original Lagrangian action
∫
dtd3xL. Such an ontologically
superfluous entity clear is not the primordial observable electric field. In electromagnetism, coupling to
charge happens through an interaction term AµJ
µ; pi is nowhere in sight. If the q’s—in this case Aµ—do
the right thing over time, all is well; if they don’t (no matter how well the conjugate momenta behave),
all is lost. In the context of GR, if the momentum πij conjugate to the 3-metric hij behaves properly,
but the extrinsic curvature tensor Kij behaves improperly, then space doesn’t fit rightly into space-time
and Einstein’s equations are false. Usually one doesn’t bother with this distinction because the boring
Hamilton’s equations h˙ij =
δH
δπij
return the correct relationship that one forgets in setting free πij in the
Legendre transformation. But that relationship is not an identity. It is just a field equation (‘on-shell’),
whereas gauge transformations are (typically, including electromagnetism and the momentum constraint
Hi in GR) defined off-shell. Hence an inept identification of gauge transformations can spoil h˙ij = δHδπij or
its electromagnetic analog, making the momenta lose their usual relationship to the velocities. h˙ij =
δH
δπij
arrives on the scene logically too late to prevent trouble; instead it just makes a mess. Hence good
behavior of the momenta does not guarantee good behavior of the velocities. The latter can, and should,
be checked directly. Naturally there will be agreement in a correct Hamiltonian formalism. With such
issues in mind Anderson and Bergmann urged attending to the Lagrangian constraint surface, not only
the Hamiltonian constraint surface (Anderson and Bergmann, 1951).
After 30 years the force of Castellani’s recovered insight about the team rather than individual char-
acter of gauge transformation generation by first-class constraints still has not been generally recognized.
He said that
Dirac’s conjecture that all secondary first-class constraints generate symmetries is revisited
and replaced by a theorem.. . . The old question whether secondary first-class constraints gen-
erate gauge symmetries or not . . . is then solved: they are part of a gauge generator G
. . . (Castellani, 1982, pp. 357, 358). (emphasis in the original)
The force of “replaced” requires the elimination of the old erroneous claim, not just the introduction of a
new true claim. Nowadays one sees a curious coexistence of beliefs in first class constraints as generating
gauge transformations (or lingering consequences of that old belief pertaining to change or observables)
and belief in the gauge generator G, a special combination of first class constraints, as generating gauge
transformations. Indeed the gauge generator is already a very old part of the constrained dynamics
literature (Anderson and Bergmann, 1951; Rosenfeld, 1930; Salisbury, 2010), so in one sense there wasn’t
much of a new claim to introduce even in 1982 (apart from the use of a 3+1 split, the 1958 trivialization
of the primaries by a well chosen boundary term (Dirac, 1958; Anderson, 1958), and elimination of q˙ from
the gauge generator in favor of Legendre projectability)—though the gauge generator had been almost
entirely forgotten apart from recent work by Mukunda (Mukunda, 1980). In a sense the Dirac conjecture
is two-sided: it claims that every first-class constraint is involved in generating gauge transformations
and that each first-class constraint that generates a gauge transformation does so by itself. (Actually
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the conjecture pertains only to secondary and higher generations of constraints, because Dirac thought
that he had proved the result for primary constraints (Dirac, 1964, p. 21).) The former claim, which is
generally received, seems to be true apart from ineffective constraints (such as squared constraints, which
have vanishing gradient and hence vanishing Poisson brackets on the constraint surface). This former
claim seems to account for some recent literature that purports to prove the Dirac conjecture while in
fact arriving at the gauge generator G instead (Gitman and Tyutin, 2006). The latter claim is false.
While Castellani’s attention (following Dirac) was initially directed to secondary constraints, it is
easy to show by direct calculation that a primary constraint in Maxwell’s electromagnetism (or in Gen-
eral Relativity) does not generate a gauge transformation either. In electromagnetism it changes the
electric field ~E by a gradient, just as the secondary constraint does (Pitts, 2013), again spoiling Gauss’s
law. Not surprisingly, a special combination of the two leaves the electric field (and the magnetic
field, which the constraints do not touch) unchanged. That combination is just the gauge generator
(Anderson and Bergmann, 1951; Castellani, 1982; Pons et al., 2000)
G =
∫
d3x(pi,i ξ − p0ξ˙).
Dropping a boundary term gives the more suggestive form
G = −
∫
d3xpν∂νξ.
G acts as
{G,Aµ} = ∂µξ
and
{G, pµ} = 0.
Hence one can reinvent the gauge generator in electromagnetism simply by requiring that the changes in
the electric field due to the first-class constraints cancel out. One can revisit Dirac’s argument that a first-
class constraint generates a gauge transformation (Dirac, 1964, p. 21) with electromagnetism in mind.
Part of the problem is that Dirac, by comparing two solutions with identical initial data, neglects the effect
that a gauge transformation can have instantaneously on the initial data surface, thus underestimating
the influence of the primary constraints. Relatedly, he neglects the fact that the secondary first-class
constraint (the one like Gauss’s law) appears in the Hamiltonian with a gauge-dependent coefficient −A0,
so two evolutions will (eventually) differ not simply by the coefficients of the primary constraint (the scalar
potential’s velocity), but also by what the Gauss-like constraint generates (Pitts, 2013; Pons, 2005). To
see the difference, notice the effects on the vector potential Ai, which is certainly altered (by a gradient)
by a gauge transformation, but is not altered by the primary constraint. Unfortunately Dirac’s error is
widely followed (Govaerts, 1991; Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992; Wipf, 1994; Rothe and Rothe, 2010).
(By contrast Sundermeyer computes relevant Poisson brackets providing the raw material to diagnose the
problem (Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 134).) This oversight of Dirac’s motivates the extended Hamiltonian
formalism, which is intended to recover the full gauge freedom which is actually already there in the
primary Hamiltonian with the primary and secondary first-class constraints.
For General Relativity, there is an additional problem in Dirac’s argument regarding the pri-
mary constraint conjugate to the lapse N (Barbour and Foster, 2008; The´bault, 2012a). The rea-
son is that his argument assumes that physically equivalent points should have equal values of
the coordinate time—in effect, that the time is observable, as was noticed by Henneaux and Teit-
elboim (Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992, pp. 17-19). They attempt to fill the gap another way
(Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992, p. 107), but give up Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence in the pro-
cess.
This paper continues the project of resolving problems in canonical General Relativity by enforcing
the equivalence of the (obscure and troubled) Hamiltonian formalism to the (perspicuous and correct)
Lagrangian formalism. The clear formalism interprets the unclear one. Maudlin’s common sense about
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change and observables is inspirational, but his disregard for the Hamiltonian formalism is not satisfac-
tory. What is needed is conceptual-technical work that identifies distinctively Hamiltonian conjectures
about gauge freedom, change, and observables and eliminates them in favor of Lagrangian-equivalent
notions. Paradoxical features of the Hamiltonian formalism are a good place to look for such problems.
Sometimes one can show that seemingly paradoxical features are equivalent to the plainly correct La-
grangian or differential geometric concepts and hence, on further reflection, no longer paradoxical. In
other cases paradoxical Hamiltonian claims are erroneous. The predecessor paper (Pitts, 2013) carried
out that task for gauge freedom and first class constraints for electromagnetism. As a consequence one
wants observables to be defined in terms of suitable Poisson brackets not with first-class constraints
separately, but with the gauge generator G (Pons et al., 2010). Another paper (in preparation) carries
out the same technical task for General Relativity (Pitts, 2014a). This current paper carries out the task
regarding change in GR using a simplification, discarding spatial dependence. Hence most of the relevant
conceptual features will be found (apart from many-fingered time), while avoiding much irrelevant techni-
cal complication. A following paper will carry out the task for observables in GR, where it turns out that
there is a key distinction between internal and external symmetries; as a result, Hamiltonian-Lagrangian
equivalence for observables involves not vanishing Poisson bracket (with G), but a Poisson bracket with
G that gives the Lie derivative of a geometric object. Meditation on the role of the transport term in
the Lie derivative shows why the absurd result of constant observables arises from imposing the van-
ishing of the Lie derivative of observables with respect to an arbitrary vector field describing the gauge
transformation: one might as reasonably ask for observable features of the world to be the same at 1 am
Eastern Daylight Time and 1 am Eastern Standard Time an hour later. While the ideas about change
and observables can be understood in isolation, the overall coherence of the package is best appreciated
collectively. Clearing away confusion about first-class constraints clears the field of entrenched errors
about change and observables to make the Lagrangian-equivalent definitions more plausible.
2.2 Invariance of Action vs. First-Class Constraints
The argument above that either first-class constraint in electromagnetism is a bad physical change as-
sumes that the electromagnetic field Fµν should count as observable. One can consider other theories in
which the observables are unknown, are not local fields (as in Yang-Mills), or are controversial. A proper
Hamiltonian formalism ought itself to specify what the observables are. Hence a perhaps even more
compelling argument that a first-class constraint does not generate a gauge transformation would refer
not to observables, but to the action principle: a gauge transformation is a time- and (typically) space-
dependent redescription that changes the action by at most a boundary term (equivalently, changes the
Lagrangian density by at most a divergence). One can show for the canonical action that each first-class
constraint generates a change that isn’t at most a boundary term and hence is not a gauge transfor-
mation, while the specially tuned sum G, the gauge generator, does change the action at most by a
boundary term and hence is a gauge transformation (Pitts, 2013). Hence one does not need to know in
advance what the observables are or even what one means by observables in order to test a change of q
and p for being a gauge transformation. Below the analogous argument will be exhibited for a simplified
relative of GR.
2.3 Illustration via Homogeneous Truncation of GR
This paper aims to deploy just enough technical apparatus to make the point about change clear—that is,
warranted and also not buried in irrelevancies—using a reparametrization-invariant ‘mechanical’ theory
derived by simply dropping the spatial dependence from GR. Such work sometimes goes by the name
“minisuperspace”; the particularly simple case addressed here corresponds to Bianchi I cosmological
models. My aim is not primarily to illuminate a very narrow sector of GR (though in many respects the
toy theory does so), but to have a ‘mechanical’ system that is analogous to GR in most ways relevant to
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the task at hand, yet allows easy calculations. It has a physically undetermined function relating physical
time to coordinate label time. This function, the “lapse function” N , appears undifferentiated in the La-
grangian and the Hamiltonian. It relates to the space-time metric as g00 = −N−2 (Misner et al., 1973).
The constrained Hamiltonian formalism due to Dirac, Bergmann, et al. associates with N a conjugate
momentum p, which is appended linearly to the Hamiltonian with an arbitrary function v(t), giving the
“primary” (or sometimes “total,” but some authors use the term differently (Govaerts, 1991)) Hamilto-
nian Hp = NH0+ vp, which generates time evolution (Sundermeyer, 1982). Whether this time evolution
constitutes objective change will be explored. The distinction between this Hamiltonian (generator of
time evolution from initial data) and the gauge generator G will be made, used and discussed in detail.
What will be achieved is a positive and intelligible Hamiltonian story about change that replaces the
mysterious one built on the assumption that a first-class constraint generates a gauge transformation.
My treatment differs from Pons and Shepley’s treatment of homogeneous cosmologies
(Pons and Shepley, 1998) primarily due to a different aim. My aim is technically much simpler, namely,
to find a theory that has enough GR-like behavior to threaten to lose time evolution just as GR does—
time reparametrization invariance with a Hamiltonian constraint quadratic in the momenta—but simple
enough that explicitly finding time evolution is easy when one looks in the right place. Confusingly, the
counting of degrees of freedom in Bianchi cosmologies depends on the intended interpretation and also
the global topology (Pons and Shepley, 1998; Ashtekar and Samuel, 1991; Salisbury et al., 2008). If one
views such cosmologies as a sector of General Relativity (without preferred simultaneity), then solutions
related by a 4-dimensional coordinate transformation will count as equivalent. Thus one achieves the
same number of degrees of freedom in the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formalisms, as one should, if one
is careful and insistent on doing so (Pons and Shepley, 1998). While the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
treatments of the ‘mechanical’ system ought to agree with each other, for my conceptual purposes, nei-
ther many-fingered time nor the momentum constraints and their first-class character, are deliberately
retained, sought, or valued. (I will have something to say about spatial variation and many-fingered time
below; I do not anticipate any essential complication or novelty compared to what happens here in treating
reparametrization-invariance.) There will be no occasion to worry about homogeneity-preserving diffeo-
morphisms or the number of degrees of freedom. Leaving redundant components in the spatial metric is
useful in order to preserve the visual-mathematical resemblance between a tensor (matrix) field in GR
and a matrix, as opposed to whittling it down to its diagonal elements (c.f., (Goldberg and Klotz, 1973;
Ryan and Shepley, 1975; Salisbury et al., 2008)). My treatment also assumes the simplest version of
homogeneity, namely, with the three spatial Killing vector fields all commuting (vanishing structure con-
stants, Bianchi type I), so one can simply keep x0 = t and drop xi (i = 1, 2, 3). Simultaneity is absolute,
but the labels of the slices are not quantitatively meaningful. I expect that the treatment of change in
terms of the lack of a time-like Killing vector field would hold for GR just as for the mechanical theory,
but with tedious and irrelevant calculations tending to obscure the main point. It will be necessary to do
a bit of logic, however, paying attention to or’s (∨), and’s (&), not’s (¬), and existential and universal
quantifiers (∃) and (∀), in order to show the equivalence of the Hamiltonian and differential geomet-
ric conceptions of change. Some classical differential geometry, especially involving scalar densities and
their Lie derivatives (Schouten, 1954; Anderson, 1967), will be needed in making the 3 + 1 split of the
space-time Killing vector equation into space (largely trivial) and time (the focus here).
3 Change Unproblematic in 4-Dimensional Geometry
3.1 Hamiltonian Impersonators Obscure Change Generator
If one attempts to define real change in terms of what some Hamiltonian-like entity generates, one has to
try to figure out which Hamiltonian-like entity to use. Even then one might not be sure that even one’s
favorite candidate generates real change. Is it the Hamiltonian constraint H0 (also called H⊥)? One
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might find this line from Sundermeyer’s book tempting: “[s]o we really infer that H⊥ is responsible for
the dynamics.” (Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 241) Is it perhaps instead the weight 2 Hamiltonian constraint√
hH0, which avoids awkward powers of the square root of the determinant of the metric and relates more
closely to hyperbolic formulations of the field equations (Anderson and York, 1998)? (Indeed the former
property can be achieved also for weight 4, weight 6, weight 8, etc. by throwing more powers of h onto√
hH0 and compensating with an oppositely weighted lapse, now taken as primitive.) Is it the canonical
Hamiltonian Hc = NH0? It has the virtue of being what results from pq˙−L once the primary constraint
is used to annihilate the coefficient of N˙ . Is it the primary Hamiltonian Hp = NH0 + vp, which adds in
the primary constraint(s)?3 Is it the gauge generator G, which is built out of the same secondary and
primary constraints as the primary Hamiltonian, and which appears to include the primary Hamiltonian
as a special case? Is it the extended Hamiltonian, which adds the secondary constraints by hand, as Dirac
invented to try to find the most general motion possible (Dirac, 1964)? Dirac’s attitude about whether
any particular Hamiltonian was the right one was quite relaxed.4 But one might expect that at most
one Hamiltonian would yield real change equivalent to the reliable Lagrangian/differential geometric
definition. With at least six moderately plausible candidates, it is best to look elsewhere besides the
Hamiltonian formalism for some more reliable criterion to decide which, if any, generates real change.
Whether there really is change in GR cannot depend on whether the theory is described in terms of the
Lagrangian or the Hamiltonian formalism. But since the answer is a clear “yes” for the Lagrangian case,
while the Hamiltonian formalism has long been obscure on the matter, it follows that the Hamiltonian
answer needs to be “yes” as well. If some Hamiltonian formalism does not give a positive answer, then
one needs to rethink the formalism until a positive answer and equivalence to the Lagrangian formalism
are achieved. Thus we will find that there is an answer that generates real change, and which of the six
(or more) candidates it is.
3.2 Time Dependence from Lack of Time-like Killing Vector Field
It is best to get back to basics—something even more basic than the Lagrangian formalism, in fact.
Change, one might say, is being different at different times. At least that definition would be adequate if
General Relativity didn’t pose the risk of fake change due to funny labeling. A revised, more GR-aware
definition would be that change is being different at different times in a way that is not an artifact of
funny labeling. A solution of Einstein’s equations displays objective change iff (and where) it depends
on time for all possible time coordinates. At this point differential geometry comes in.
General Relativity expressed in the language of Lagrangian field theory and four-dimensional differen-
tial geometry is generally not believed to suffer from a problem of time or a lack of observable quantities
(Pons et al., 2010). One of course needs to account for the coordinate (gauge) freedom, but that is not
difficult to do—tensors and all that. (All transformations are interpreted passively, thereby averting one
gratuitous source of confusion, namely, primitive point identities moving around relative to the physical
properties.) There is change if (or where) the metric is not “stationary,” that is, if (or where) there
exists no time-like Killing vector field (Wald, 1984; Kramer et al., 1980). (A local section suffices for
having no change locally—in a neighborhood where there is a time-like Killing vector, there change does
not happen. The Schwarzschild solution outside the horizon is a familiar example.) A time-like Killing
vector field ξµ is a vector field such that is Killing relative to the metric,
£ξgµν = ξ
αgµν ,α+gµαξ
α,ν +gανξ
α,µ= ∇µξν +∇νξµ = 0, (5)
making the metric independent of a coordinate adapted to ξα (Ohanian and Ruffini, 1994, p. 352), and
that is time-like relative to the metric (gµνξ
µξν < 0 using − + ++ signature). Lie differentiation £ξ is
3If one is willing to keep N˙ in the Hamiltonian formalism, then one can use the Sudarshan-Mukunda Hamiltonian instead
(Sudarshan and Mukunda, 1974, p. 93) (Castellani, 1982).
4I thank Edward Anderson for a useful comment on this point.
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a more or less tensorial directional derivative; when acting on tensors or connections, it gives a tensor
(Yano, 1957). The nonexistence of a time-like Killing vector field is the coordinate-invariant statement of
change: change is not being stationary (neighborhood by neighborhood) (Kramer et al., 1980). Quanti-
ties are observable if they are tensors, tensor densities, or more general geometric objects (Nijenhuis, 1952;
Schouten, 1954; Anderson, 1967) and are not compromised by some other convention-dependence such
as electromagnetic gauge freedom. All of this is uncontroversial in the 4-dimensional Lagrangian context
(Wald, 1984). I mention it in some detail only because of the general failure to attend adequately to the
Hamiltonian analogs in the appropriate contexts.
Because change is locally defined in terms of the lack of a time-like Killing vector field (or more
generally, the lack of a time-like vector such that the Lie derivative of everything, metrical and material,
vanishes, if matter is present), one need not attend to boundary terms to define change. Thus non-trivial
topologies also admit change, even if they have no boundaries. Even if the world is like a doughnut, there
is change in GR. Just watch for change in a room with no windows, such as a basement. The difficulty
in knowing what happens at infinity, or knowing whether there is any such place, will be no hindrance.
This Lagrangian platitude amounts to a revisionist Hamiltonian research project.
4 Vacuum GR without Spatial Dependence
In this section, which forms the heart of the paper, I will show how a proper Hamiltonian treatment of
GR does indeed involve change. Change will be exhibited in a truncated form of GR obtained by simply
dropping the spatial dependence. Such a simplified toy theory has most of the features that threaten to
obscure time and change in GR, apart from “many-fingered time” (freedom to define various simultaneity
hypersurfaces). The treatment of the toy theory will also show by a tractable and interesting example
how Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics works. Then I will recall my recent result that a first-class
constraint generates a bad physical change—not a gauge transformation as is often held. Because a
first-class constraint does not generate a gauge transformation, one is no longer tempted to infer from
the fact that the Hamiltonian of GR is a sum of first-class constraints that time evolution is only a gauge
transformation and hence that there is no real evolution or change. With that erroneous Hamiltonian
story undermined, one is well positioned to attend to the correct Hamiltonian story, which involves
detailed attention to the equations of motion and to gauge transformations, which must be equivalent
to the Lagrangian coordinate transformations (or at any rate to the ones involving time in this spatially
truncated toy theory) at least for solutions of the equations of motion. (Inconveniently, it is provable that
kinematically possible but dynamically impossible trajectories have a gauge freedom that is not simply
related to changing the time coordinate.) One already knows from differential geometry what it is for
there to be change in a solution of Einstein’s equations, that is, for the solution not to be stationary:
change is just the absence of a time-like Killing vector field. It will be found that the Hamiltonian
equations of motion imply that, for all choices of (time) coordinate, something depends on time if and
only if there is no (time-like) Killing vector field. It will then be shown that the gauge generator G
implements using Hamiltonian resources exactly the infinitesimal changes of time coordinate via Lie
differentiation, at least on-shell.
4.1 Homogeneous Truncation
One can capture just enough of the real physics of GR, while maintaining manifest relevance and avoiding
most complication, by using a toy theory, vacuum GR with all spatial coordinate derivatives dropped.
Such a restriction is both a substantial physical restriction compared to GR, and an adaptation of
coordinates to fit the restricted physics. Because the coefficient of the shift vector N i in the Lagrangian,
namely the momentum constraint, vanishes when nothing varies with the spatial coordinates, N i no
longer appears in the formalism at all. Thus no corresponding primary constraints exist. What remains
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is reparametrization invariance, with the lapse function N(t) an arbitrary function (assuming positivity,
boundedness away from 0, differentiability to some order, etc. as usual). Calculations are easy, but the
resemblance to GR is clear.
For a partial treatment of GR in Hamiltonian form, two standard texts treat the subject
(Misner et al., 1973; Wald, 1984) (but watch for opposite conventions in defining the extrinsic curva-
ture). These texts take a short-cut by dropping the primary constraints and treating the lapse function
and shift vector as Lagrange multipliers with no conjugate momenta—a procedure that is adequate for
getting the field equations of these theories, but does not work for general field theories and that leaves
one quite unable to express 4-dimensional gauge transformations in Hamiltonian form. So one turns else-
where (Sundermeyer, 1982), especially given the recent G-related appreciation of primary constraints. If
one sets ∂
∂xi
(anything) = 0 (where i=1,2,3), then the Lagrangian density L—now rather a Lagrangian
L, simplifies to
L = N
√
h(KijKij −K2), (6)
where the extrinsic curvature tensor (a sort of 3-dimensional tensorial ‘velocity’ in GR) simplifies due to
disappearance of the shift vector and its derivatives:
Kij =
1
2N
h˙ij ,
with the dot denoting the coordinate time derivative, hij the spatial 3-metric, and the lapse function
N being related to the space-time metric by N = 1√
−g00
. It is perhaps better to use the slicing density
α = N/
√
h (or even the logarithm thereof) as a canonical coordinate (Anderson and York, 1998), partly
to enforce positivity (Goldberg and Klotz, 1973), but N is quite entrenched. The spatial Ricci curvature
scalar has disappeared. There being, so to speak, no potential energy, the actual dynamics will be rather
dull. That does not matter, however, because all the formal properties that we need will appear. Note
that the time derivative of N does not appear in the Lagrangian.
4.2 Generalized Legendre Transformation from L to H
Defining canonical momenta as usual, one has
πij =def
∂L
∂hij ,0
=
√
h(Kij −Khij)
and
p =def
∂L
∂N,0
= 0.
In going over to the Hamiltonian formalism, one forgets these definitions, recovering the πij equation
as an equation of motion and requiring of p merely that it stay 0. That condition is called a “primary
constraint” because it arises at the first stage of the Hamiltonian analysis.
Performing the Legendre transformation to get from L to H (and using p = 0 where needed), one
gets the canonical Hamiltonian
Hc = NH0, (7)
where
H0 = πijπab(hiahbj − 1
2
hijhab)/
√
h. (8)
(Given that the Hamilton density has turned into the Hamiltonian, one could drop the script font for
the Hamiltonian constraint H0. But to emphasize the link to GR, I will retain it.) Time evolution is
generated by the primary Hamiltonian (which adds the primary constraints to the canonical Hamiltonian
(Sundermeyer, 1982):
Hp = NH0 + vp, (9)
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where v(t) is an arbitrary function, which one readily sees is equated to N˙ using the basic Poisson bracket
{N, p} = 1 and calculating {N,Hp}.5 It is evident that both constraints are first-class. {H0,H0} = 0
because dropping the spatial dependence makes everything difficult about the ‘Dirac algebra’ disappear
and Poisson brackets are anti-symmetric, in contrast to spatially varying GR’s {H0(x),H0(y)} which
involves derivatives of Dirac δ functions (Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 239). {p,H0} = 0 because H0 does not
depend on N. Finally, {p, p} = 0 by antisymmetry and the fact that p is one of the canonical coordinates.
Letting ψ be an arbitrary function of hij , π
ij , N, and p, one can calculate the time evolution of ψ:
{ψ,Hp} = ∂ψ
∂hij
∂Hp
∂πij
− ∂ψ
∂πij
∂Hp
∂hij
+
∂ψ
∂N
v − ∂ψ
∂p
· 0 (10)
using H0 = 0 after taking the Poisson bracket. (The symbol ≈ is often used for equality on a constraint
surface, but I will not bother. One also speaks of equations that hold “on-shell,” which is shorter than
“on the constraint surface and using the evolution equations as needed.”) It follows that
{hij ,Hp} = ∂Hp
∂πij
=
2N√
h
(haihbj − 1
2
hijhab)π
ab = h˙ij ,
{πij ,Hp} = −∂Hp
∂hij
= − N√
h
(2πiaπja − ππij − 12π
abπabh
ij +
1
4
π2hij) = π˙ij ,
{N,Hp} = ∂Hp
∂p
= v = N˙,
{p,Hp} = −∂Hp
∂N
= −H0 = 0 = p˙. (11)
4.3 A First-Class Constraint Generates a Bad Physical Change
Much as in the electromagnetic case, in GR or its homogeneous reduction a first-class constraint generates
not a gauge transformation, but a bad physical change. (One expects such a result to be typical for the-
ories in which primary first-class constraints have descendents, secondary and maybe higher generations
of constraints that follow from the first-class primaries.) In the case of electromagnetism (Pitts, 2013)
and full GR (in preparation (Pitts, 2014a)), one way to spot the bad physical change is in the spoilage of
the Lagrangian constraint equations, Gauss’s law in terms of the electric field (not canonical momenta)
or the Gauss-Codazzi relations describing the embedding of space into space-time. Such spoilage of a
Lagrangian constraint is a sufficient condition for a change to be bad, but presumably is not necessary.
What does p do to the q− q˙ Hamiltonian constraint, the normal-normal part of Einstein’s equations?
To answer that question in GR, it is convenient to define a lapse-less factor in the extrinsic curvature
tensor: Lij =df NKij =
1
2
(h˙ij −DiNj −DjNi). Thus
{
∫
d3yǫ(y)p(y),KijKij −KiiKjj −R(x)} =
∫
d3yǫ(y){p(y),N−2(x)(LijLij − L2(x))}
= 2ǫ(x)N−1(KijKij −K2), (12)
which in full GR is generally nonzero due to the spatial Ricci scalar term −R. In the homogeneous
truncation, R and the shift vector N i are absent. But the former contributes nothing anyway, while the
latter’s contribution (by virtue of being multiplied by a factor involving the lapse) is accounted for in
the Kij terms, so the absence of those contributions in the homogeneous truncation does not change the
result:
{
∫
d3yǫ(y)p(y),KijKij −KiiKjj } = 2ǫ(x)N−1(KijKij −K2). (13)
In GR, that expression would be generically nonzero (and not a Lie derivative either) because KijKij −
KiiK
j
j = R; hence that Poisson bracket would clearly manifest a bad physical change, spoiling the
5 If one keeps N˙ itself in the formalism (Sudarshan and Mukunda, 1974; Castellani, 1982), then one does not suppress N˙
via the primary constraint p = 0, introduce a new function v unrelated to phase space, and then recover v = N˙.
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constraint equation that is the time-time part of Einstein’s equations. For the homogeneous truncation,
the vanishing of the 3-dimensional Ricci scalar R makes that Poisson bracket look not so bad. Sometimes
very special cases produce potentially misleading simplifications, so it is best not to forget the guidance
from full GR, given that it (not the homogeneous truncation) is ultimately what we seek to understand.
For GR, one can show that each of the first-class constraints p, pi, H0 and Hi spoils all of the Lagrangian
constraints. One expects that the appropriate teaming arrangements (the gauge generators) will cause
all the badness to cancel out, which has been show to occur in one case and presumably will occur when
the remaining three are completed. The calculations are analogous to the electromagnetic case except, of
course, much harder. Much as one notices for electromagnetism that the electric field is changed by the
primary first-class constraint and therefore Gauss’s law is violated, spoilage of the Lagrangian constraints
is a generally logically weaker consequence of first-class constraint transformation behavior that differs
from the known gauge transformations.
One can go on to show that varying the lapse function N in an arbitrary way changes what ought to
be physically invariant quantities, namely, Komar’s intrinsic Weyl curvature scalar coordinates. (Here
one assumes a generic but not completely general situation, namely, the absence of Killing vector fields;
see also (Komar, 1955).) The Weyl tensor, the totally traceless part of the Riemann curvature tensor for
space-time, is the part of the Riemann tensor not specified by Einstein’s equations. Typically it has 4 inde-
pendent scalar concomitants, two quadratic, two cubic (Bergmann and Komar, 1960; Bergmann, 1962;
Pons and Salisbury, 2005), that remain after Einstein’s equations (source-free, coupled to electromag-
netism, or perhaps more generally) have been imposed. One can of course devise other functions of these
(Bergmann and Komar, 1960). (In that sense, any coordinate system is a Weyl scalar coordinate system,
a fact that has significant implications.) The Weyl scalars can be written, using Einstein’s equations if
necessary, in terms of the spatial metric tensor, the extrinsic curvature tensor, and their derivatives. In
terms of canonical coordinates, one can re-express these expressions in terms of the canonical momenta
πij instead of the extrinsic curvature Kij . In terms of the 3-metric and its canonical momenta, the
Weyl scalars are independent of the lapse and the shift vector. But such replacement uses the Hamil-
ton equations
δHp
δπij
= h˙ij , which are not identities. Hence a more primordial form of the Weyl scalars
leaves them in terms of hij and Kij . But Kij is not primitive; it is derived in terms of the definition
Kij =
1
2N
h˙ij + . . . . Hence the Weyl scalars in terms of q and q˙ depend on N inversely from how they
depend on the lapse-independent quantity Lij = NKij , which depends on h˙ij . Hence one could write the
Weyl scalars in terms of hij , Lij , and N in order to make the dependence on q and q˙ clearer. But then
it is evident that varying N arbitrarily (while leaving h˙ij alone), as the smeared primary constraint p
does, will alter the Weyl scalar(s)—something that a real gauge transformation could never do. Hence
what the primary first-class constraint p generates is a bad physical change, not a gauge transformation.
With that reminder to check the full transformation behavior, not just what happens to the La-
grangian constraints, one can consider the Hamiltonian constraint H0. One can find the relation between
H0 and space-time coordinate transformations by starting with the gauge generator G (Castellani, 1982)
and throwing away some terms to isolate H0. As will appear below, G has a bunch of terms involving
the primary constraints, the lapse and shift, and (in some cases) the spatial 3-metric (Castellani, 1982);
these will not affect the 3-metric hij , which only sees it own conjugate momentum due to the structure
of the Poisson bracket. Homogeneous truncation also eliminates Hi. Thus
{hij(x), G} = {hij(x),
∫
d3yǫ⊥(y)H0(y)},
where ǫ⊥ is the normal projection of the 4-vector ξµ describing an infinitesimal coordinate transformation,
ǫ⊥ = Nξ0. One has
{hij(x),
∫
d3yǫ⊥(y)H0(y)} = δµi δνj£(ǫ⊥nα)gµν(x).
That looks good for getting a coordinate transformation out ofH0, but then {N(x),
∫
d3yǫ⊥(y)H0(y)} = 0
shows that part of the remainder of the space-time Lie derivative formula is violated: the lapse N
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certainly changes under a change of time coordinate, but H0 fails to effect such a change. Thus H0
does not generate a coordinate transformation either. As with electromagnetism, a first-class constraint,
primary or secondary, generates a bad physical change. Only the special combination G generates a
gauge transformation.
4.4 Quasi-Invariance of Action vs. First-Class Constraints
Above it was found for electromagnetism that each first-class constraint changes the action, but the same
specially tuned sum that preserves the electric field also preserves the action (up to a boundary term),
yielding agreement between two different criteria. For GR it is less clear what counts as an observable,
the analogous argument to preserving the electric field might be problematic. One can still test each
individual first-class constraint for whether it preserves the action (up to a boundary term), however.
As with electromagnetism, neither one does. One can also see that a specially tuned sum, the gauge
generator G, does change the action by only a boundary term.
The canonical Lagrangian LH = pq˙ −H = pN˙ + πijh˙ij −Hp = πijh˙ij −Hcanonical = πijh˙ij −NH0
introduces canonical momenta πij as auxiliary fields into the action, thus preserving equivalence to the
usual Lagrangian L. To see what the primary constraint p does, one multiplies it by an arbitrary function
ξ(t) (though without any spatial smearing):
{ξp, πijh˙ij −NH0} = 0 + {ξp,−NH0} = ξH0, (14)
which is not a total derivative. Thus the primary first-class constraint does not generate a gauge trans-
formation.
Likewise for the secondary constraint:
{ǫ(t)H0, πij h˙ij −NH0} = {ǫH0, πijh˙ij} − 0 = {ǫH0, πij}h˙ij + {ǫH0, h˙ij}πij . (15)
One can evaluate this expression either by integrating over time and integrating by parts, or using the
Anderson-Bergmann velocity Poisson bracket. Either way, one finds the result
{ǫ(t)H0, πij h˙ij −NH0} = ǫH˙0 − ∂
∂t
(
ǫπij
∂H0
∂πij
)
, (16)
which is not a total derivative. Thus the secondary first-class constraint does not generate a gauge
transformation either.
If one combines the primary and secondary constraints with their arbitrary coefficients, and then asks
the sum to be a total derivative, one can succeed; one finds that ξ = ǫ˙ and the canonical Lagrangian
pq˙ −H changes by
∂
∂t
(
ǫ
[
H0 − πij ∂H0
∂πij
])
.
Thus the action is quasi-invariant, which is just the condition for preserving the equations of motion.
The tuned sum of first-class constraints is, not surprisingly, just the gauge generator G.
4.5 Change from Hamilton’s Equations
Change is (real) time dependence. There is a risk of fake change in GR by a funny time choice or a funny
labeling of space over time. Hence one needs a savvy definition: there is real change if and only if, for
all choices of coordinates, there is time dependence. In reparametrization-invariant theories, one can try
to generate fake change by speeding up (bunching up) or slowing down (spreading out) the labeling of
the time slices. In GR the possibilities for fake change are much more varied due to many-fingered time
and to the possibility of letting spatial coordinates slide around over time via the shift vector. But I’ll
continue with the toy theory that is simple, but not too simple. Fake change is then apparent change that
exists only for some choices of time coordinate. Note that the question is whether something or other
16
depends on time; it isn’t obviously required that some single quantity depend on time in all coordinate
systems.
If there is real change, then there is time dependence for all choices of labeling of the time slices in
that interval: ∀ labelings (h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ π˙ij 6= 0 ∨ N˙ 6= 0). (If there is no real change, then ∃ labeling
such that h˙ij = 0 & π˙
ij = 0 & N˙ = 0.) It would be nice if one didn’t have to worry about N˙, a
rather slippery quantity that is determined by conventional gauge (coordinate) choice: it vanishes for
some time coordinates but not others. Thus N˙ 6= 0 doesn’t hold reliably; but can N˙ team up with h˙ij
or π˙ij so that at least one of them is nonzero for any time coordinate? Not usefully: h˙ij , π
ij , and π˙ij
are all scalar densities (of whatever weights) or scalars under change of time coordinate. Thus if they
vanish, they do so invariantly; if they fail to vanish, they do so invariantly. So they can’t use help from
N˙. If there is a time coordinate such that h˙ij = 0 and π˙
ij = 0, there is a time coordinate that also
yields N˙ = 0 because N˙ has an affine rather than strictly linear time coordinate transformation law. It
therefore cannot bear the load of being the locus of real change, and indeed cannot even help to bear
that load. So the quantifier over time coordinates (labelings of the slices) can be dropped, as can the
disjunct N˙ 6= 0. Thus there is a nice
Result: There is real change in the homogeneous vacuum theory if and only if h˙ij 6= 0 ∨
π˙ij 6= 0 in some coordinate system (and hence in all coordinate systems).
One could simplify a bit further using Hamilton’s equations for the toy theory, but there is no need to
do so and some of the simplifications would not carry over to GR.
The reasoning also is reversible. Because in the homogeneous truncation hij and π
ij are a scalar
and a pseudo-scalar (respectively) under changes of time coordinate (hence scalars for the infinitesimal
transformations used in Lie differentiation), the non-vanishing of either of these velocities h˙ij 6= 0 or
π˙ij 6= 0 in some coordinate system implies that same non-vanishing in all time coordinate systems, and
thus the non-vanishing of the time derivative of something or other in every coordinate system.
4.6 Change from Differential Geometry: No Time-like Killing Vector
Now let us ascertain the conditions for the non-existence or existence of a time-like Killing vector, or
the relevant analog thereof, and see how it lines up with the time evolution generated by Hp. We need
the 3 + 1 split of the Lie derivative formula for an infinitesimal coordinate transformation £ξgµν =
ξαgµν ,α +gµαξ
α,ν +gαµξ
α,µ (Mukhanov and Wipf, 1995). Actually we need only the x
i-independent
homogeneous truncation of the 3 + 1 split, which is much cleaner. One has, besides rigid affine spatial
coordinate transformations (which would be important if we cared about counting degrees of freedom
(Ryan and Shepley, 1975; Ashtekar and Samuel, 1991; Pons and Shepley, 1998), but which I ignore),
δN = ξ0N˙ +Nξ˙0,
δhij = ξ
0h˙ij .
The formula for the variation of the momenta δπij is derived using Kij = NΓ
0
ij and Hamilton’s equations
(Pons et al., 2000; Thiemann, 2007). The result simplifies enormously for the homogeneous toy theory:
δπij = ξ0π˙ij . One also needs p to stay 0 somehow. One can show that p is a weight −1 scalar density
under change of time coordinate, so δp = £ξp = ξ
0p˙− ξ˙0p, which will stay 0 using both the constraints.
Hence the condition for the existence of a time-like Killing vector field is equivalent (using Hamilton’s
equations as needed) to
(∃ξ0)(ξ0N˙ +Nξ˙0 = 0 & ξ0h˙ij = 0 & ξ0π˙ij = 0). (17)
Thus the condition for change is just the negation of this triple conjunction. Below some logical manip-
ulations will be performed from this point.
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4.7 GGenerates Lie Differentiation On-shell in Hamiltonian Formalism
The gauge generator G by design ought to give these same formulas just obtained from 4-dimensional
differential geometry, at least for solutions of all the Hamiltonian equations and constraints. G is a bit
complicated in GR (Castellani, 1982; Pons et al., 2000): it is a specific sum of the secondary constraints
H0 and Hi and the primary constraints p and pi with coefficients savoring of Lie differentiation. While
it will not be necessary here to use the whole expression, it might be useful to have it anyway. Making
sure that G and the changes that it generates live in phase space requires eliminating N˙ by taking not
the time component ξ0, but a 3+1 projected relative ǫ⊥ = Nξ0 as primitive and hence having vanishing
Poisson brackets with everything (Castellani, 1982; Pons et al., 2000). (My notation, opposite to Pons,
Salisbury and Shepley’s but partly in line with Castellani’s, uses ξµ for the coordinate basis components
of the vector ξ and lets ǫ be the 3 + 1 projected descriptors.)
It is most readily given in two parts, one for gauge transformations that do not preserve the simul-
taneity hypersurface, and one for spatial coordinate transformations. Note that I am not worrying about
spatial boundary terms (on which the two sources above disagree), partly because there is no point in
trying to run before walking. Castellani’s notation also tends to hide dependence on the spatial metric,
which is made explicit here. The normal gauge generator is
G[ǫ, ǫ˙] =
∫
d3x[ǫ⊥H0 + ǫ⊥pjhijN,i+ǫ⊥(Npihij),j +ǫ⊥(pN j),j +ǫ˙⊥p]. (18)
It generates on phase space-time a transformation that, for solutions of the Hamiltonian field equations,
changes the time coordinate in line with 4-dimensional tensor calculus. The spatial gauge generator is
G[ǫi, ǫ˙i] =
∫
d3x[ǫiHi + ǫiN j ,i pj − ǫj ,iN ipj + ǫiN,i p+ ǫi,0 pi]. (19)
This spatially projected descriptor ǫi, on account of the shift vector that allows the spatial coordinates to
slide around over time, is not simply the spatial components ξi of ξ. Instead it is given by ǫi = ξi+N iξ0.
It generates spatial coordinate transformations that respect the simultaneity hypersurfaces.
Roughly speaking, the coefficients of the primary constraints are those needed to transform the lapse
and shift in such a way as to fill the holes left by the secondary constraints (c.f. the common error that
the secondary constraints by themselves do generate coordinate transformations). For spatial coordinate
transformations, which have the virtues of being defined even without using the equations of motion and
manifestly relating to fragments of tensor calculus, one has the good news (Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 241)
{hij(x),
∫
d3yξk(y)Hk(y)} = £ξhij(x),
{πij(x),
∫
d3yξk(y)Hk(y)} = £ξπij(x) (20)
that might tempt one to think that a coordinate transformation is being made, but also the bad news
{Hi(x), N j(y)} = 0,
{Hi(x),N(y)} = 0 (21)
that shows that no coordinate transformation is made unless quite specific assistance from the primary
constraints pi and even p is brought in. A similar story holds for H0 (Kiriushcheva and Kuzmin, 2011, p.
603), which is loosely tied to both time evolution and changes of time coordinate, but by itself generates
neither one.
In our xi-independent homogeneous truncation, G simplifies nicely. One can ignore the spatial gauge
generator. Throwing away spatial dependence, besides discarding the momentum constraint Hi = 0 and
the primary constraints pi = 0 tying down the momenta conjugate to the shift vector, also annihilates
the structure constant C000 = 0 for the Hamiltonian constraint with itself. One has for the spatially
truncated normal gauge generator
G = ǫ⊥H0 + pǫ˙⊥. (22)
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One finds that G has the following Poisson brackets with the basic canonical variables:
{hij , G} = ξ0N 2√
h
(haihbj − 1
2
hijhab)π
ab = ξ0{hij ,Hp},
{πij , G} = −ξ0 N√
h
(2πiaπja − ππij − 12π
abπabh
ij +
1
4
π2hij) = ξ0{πij ,Hp},
{N,G} = ˙ǫ⊥ = ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N,
{p,G} = 0 (23)
identically. Using Hamilton’s equations, one has “on-shell”
{hij , G} = ξ0h˙ij ,
{πij , G} = ξ0π˙ij ,
{N,G} = ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N,
{p,G} = 0. (24)
One sees that these equations match the Lie derivative formulas δN = ξ0N˙ + Nξ˙0 (N being a weight
1 scalar density under change of time coordinate and thus having this Lie derivative (Anderson, 1967)),
δhij = ξ
0h˙ij , and δπ
ij = ξ0π˙ij , while δp = 0 is also fine even without fitting the weight −1 den-
sity character of p, so the gauge generator G deserves its name. The Hamiltonian formalism im-
plements 4-dimensional coordinate transformations at least on solutions of the Hamilton equations
(Thiemann, 2007); here the one-dimensional temporal analog is explicit and convenient.
If and only if there exists a (time-like) Killing vector ‘field’ ξµ, the Poisson brackets of the canonical
variables with G should all vanish (in all time coordinates):
{hij , G} = ξ0h˙ij = 0,
{πij , G} = ξ0π˙ij = 0,
{N,G} = ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N = 0,
{p,G} = 0. (25)
This is just the Killing vector condition
(∃ξ0)(ξ0N˙ +Nξ˙0 = 0 & ξ0h˙ij = 0 & ξ0π˙ij = 0) (26)
from the previous subsection, along with a suitable claim about the primary constraint (the boring
canonical momentum that is always 0). Change is related to a lack of a time-like Killing vector field, so
let us negate. The primary constraint p has to remain 0 no matter what. The Killing vector condition,
being tensorial, holds in all coordinate systems or fails in all of them, so there is no need to quantify over
labelings (time coordinates). Thus the lack of a Killing vector is
(∀ξ0)(ξ0h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ ξ0π˙ij 6= 0 ∨ ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N 6= 0).
Vanishing ξ0 would not count as Killing (or time-like), so the no-Killing condition is
(∀ξ0)(h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ π˙ij 6= 0 ∨ (ξ0N),0 6= 0).
All three disjuncts are scalar densities of some weight or other, so their vanishings or not are invariant—
recall that no quantification over time labelings was needed. There is always some ξ0 that can make
(ξ0N),0 = 0; ξ
0 = N−1 or some constant multiple thereof will do. Because the last disjunct (ξ0N),0 6= 0
is unreliable and the other two don’t depend on ξ0, the quantification over ξ0 can also be dropped. Hence
one has another
Result: the non-existence of a time-like Killing vector field is equivalent to h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ π˙ij 6= 0.
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That condition holds in all (time) coordinates if it holds in any. This reasoning is also reversible.
This condition is exactly the one found above using the time evolution generated by Hp and asking
it to be nonzero in all coordinate systems. Thus the primary Hamiltonian’s time evolution gives exactly
the same result as 4-dimensional differential geometric Lie differentiation. The primary Hamiltonian is
thus vindicated out of the right choice out of the six or more candidates—no surprise in light of the
known equivalence of the primary Hamiltonian to the Lagrangian.
The Lie derivative formula, in turn, is implemented in the Hamiltonian formalism (at least on-
shell) using the gauge generator G, as was already known (Castellani, 1982). There is real change just
in case there is no time-like Killing vector field. Expecting the Hamiltonian formalism to match the
unproblematic Lagrangian/differential geometric formalism has resolved the problem in terms of the role
of a time-like Killing vector field, as promised in the title. This agreement makes change in classical
canonical GR, or at any rate in the toy theory, luminously clear and satisfying. Working in full GR
would add messy terms that tend to obscure the point. GR adds the further issue of many-fingered time.
I expect that an analysis of this sort would work fine even for GR.
Defining change in terms of the lack of a time-like Killing vector field provides an attractive way to
remain non-committal regarding a choice between, for example, “intrinsic time” involving h or “extrinsic
time” involving πijhij , at least classically. The expressions involving quantifiers and conjunctions (&,
and) or disjunctions (∨, or) give a tensorial statement that hij or πij (or both) depends on time t. It
might well be the case that a time could be dug out of hij in some regions but not others, but that π
ij
can fill the gaps; a recollapsing Big Bang model at the moment the expansion stops and reverses is a
familiar example. Of course it would be ideal not to have to choose at all. But if one must choose, the
equivalence of the expressions using quantifiers and conjunctions or disjunctions to the (negation of the)
tensorial Killing equation implies that there is always something that could be chosen as time, and that
the baton is smoothly passed back and forth as needed (classically).
5 Change with Matter: A Massive Scalar Field
5.1 Change in Hamiltonian Formalism from Hp
Thus far change has been sorted out for (a homogeneous truncation of) vacuum General Relativity, but
not for (a homogeneous truncation of) General Relativity with sources. To address the latter question, one
can introduce a scalar field φ, for generality a massive scalar field. Recalling that change is ineliminable
time dependence, there is no change in a space-time region just in case there exists everywhere in that
region a time-like vector field ξµ that is ‘Killing’ in a generalized sense for both the metric and the matter:
(∃ξµ)(£ξgµν = 0 & £ξφ = 0). (27)
What does this condition come to in terms of a 3+ 1 Hamiltonian formalism? It will give a Hamiltonian
definition of change, one potentially involving the matter as a change-bearer, not just gravity. As usual,
throwing away spatial dependence will simplify matters.
The starting Lagrangian density is now (Sundermeyer, 1982)
L = LGR − 1
2
φ,µ φ,ν g
µν√−g − m
2
2
φ2
√−g. (28)
Making the 3+1 ADM split and discarding spatial dependence, one has
L = N
√
h(KijKij −K2) +
√
h
2N
φ˙2 − m
2
2
N
√
hm2φ2. (29)
The canonical momentum πij for gravity is as before, while the new canonical momentum for the scalar
field φ is
πφ =
∂L
∂φ˙
=
√
h
N
φ˙, (30)
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which is trivially inverted. The primary Hamiltonian is
Hp = N(H0 +H0φ) + vp = NH0 +N
(
π2φ
2
√
h
+
m2
√
hφ2
2
)
+ vp. (31)
Note that a massless scalar field (m = 0) would behave as a free particle, making φ evolve mono-
tonically and hence be a pretty good clock, but a massive scalar field behaves as a harmonic oscillator,
with the φ and its momentum πφ oscillating. Hence a massive scalar field avoids unrealistic simplicity
and thus is more representative of other matter fields and even what happens in spatially inhomogeneous
contexts than is a massless scalar field.
One can now find Hamilton’s equations.
{hij ,Hp} = ∂Hp
∂πij
=
2N√
h
(haihbj − 1
2
hijhab)π
ab = h˙ij
as before.
{πij ,Hp} = −∂Hp
∂hij
= − N√
h
(2πiaπja − ππij − 1
2
πabπabh
ij +
1
4
π2hij) +
N
4
√
h
(
π2φh
ij −m2hhijφ2
)
= π˙ij .
{N,Hp} = ∂Hp∂p = v = N˙ as before. {p,Hp} = −
∂Hp
∂N
= −H0 −H0φ = 0 = p˙, sprouting a contribution
from φ. The novel equations are {φ,Hp} = Nπφ√
h
= φ˙, which inverts the Legendre transformation back
from q, p to q, q˙ for matter φ, and
{πφ,Hp} = −m2N
√
hφ = π˙φ, (32)
which gives the interesting part of the dynamics of the massive scalar field.
There is real change if and only if something depends on time for every choice of time coordinate
(labeling):
(∀labeling)(h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ π˙ij 6= 0 ∨ N˙ 6= 0 ∨ φ˙ 6= 0 ∨ π˙φ 6= 0).
One can always set N˙ to 0, because its transformation law is affine, but h˙ij , π˙
ij , φ˙, and π˙φ are all scalar
densities, vanishing or not invariantly. Hence one can drop both the N˙ disjunct and the quantifier ∀ over
time labelings. Thus there is change iff
h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ π˙ij 6= 0 ∨ φ˙ 6= 0 ∨ π˙φ 6= 0. (33)
Thus the burden of bearing change can be shared among these four quantities. One can, for example,
pass the baton around as needed among hij , π
ij , φ and πφ.
5.2 Differential Geometric Change: No Generalized Killing Vector
From the standpoint of differential geometry, a solution of Einstein’s equations with a scalar field should
be regarded as changeless (a generalization of stationarity) just in case there is no time-like vector field
ξµ satisfying the generalized Killing condition
£ξgµν = 0 & £ξφ = 0. (34)
Neither gravity nor matter changes, and nothing else is present, so nothing changes. In principle this
pair of equations might be redundant if the equations are not independent. Can matter change without
making gravity change also? That is of no concern for present purposes, partly because such a result
might be model-dependent: it might depend on what types and numbers of fields are used as matter.
What is of interest is not special features of a massive scalar field, but features likely to be representative
of a broad class of matter sources in GR.
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As before, a 3 + 1 split, followed by throwing away spatial dependence, is useful. The nontrivial new
part is that we will need something like ‘£ξπφ.’ From the experience with the vacuum case, we expect
to need the relation πφ =
√
h
N
φ˙, which holds due to
{φ,Hp} = Nπφ√
h
= φ˙.
Under time relabelings,
√
h is unmoved, whereas N ′ = N
∣∣∣ ∂x0∂x0′ ∣∣∣ (weight 1 and not flipping signs under
time reversal) and φ˙′ = φ˙ ∂x
0
∂x0′
(also weight 1 but flipping signs under time-reversal). Hence πφ is a
scalar under time coordinate transformations not involving reversal (good enough for Lie differentiation),
yielding
£ξ
(√
h
N
φ˙
)
= ξ0
∂
∂t
(√
h
N
φ˙
)
. (35)
Using Hamilton’s equations that last expression equals ξ0 ∂
∂t
πφ.
Now we can write the Hamiltonian version of the Killing-like condition for no change:
(∃ξ0)(ξ0h˙ij = 0 & ξ0π˙ij = 0 & ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N = 0 & ξ0φ˙ = 0 & ξ0π˙φ = 0).
(Naturally p needs to stay 0 also.) Negating to find the condition for change, one has
¬(∃ξ0)(ξ0h˙ij = 0 & ξ0π˙ij = 0 & ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N = 0 & ξ0φ˙ = 0 & ξ0π˙φ = 0) ↔
(∀ξ0) ¬(ξ0h˙ij = 0 & ξ0π˙ij = 0 & ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N = 0 & ξ0φ˙ = 0 & ξ0π˙φ = 0) ↔
(∀ξ0) (ξ0h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ ξ0π˙ij 6= 0 ∨ ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N 6= 0 ∨ ξ0φ˙ 6= 0 ∨ ξ0π˙φ 6= 0). (36)
The condition (ξ0N),0 6= 0 is completely unreliable (strongly coordinate-dependent), whereas the other
four disjuncts are all invariant. Hence the disjunct (ξ0N),0 6= 0 can be dropped. Vanishing ξ0 would not
count as Killing, so that factor can be dropped. Now nothing depends on ξ0, so the quantification over
it can be dropped. Thus the generalized no-Killing condition for change is
h˙ij 6= 0 ∨ π˙ij 6= 0 ∨ φ˙ 6= 0 ∨ π˙φ 6= 0. (37)
This is exactly what was derived above from the Hamiltonian time evolution from Hp. Hence the gen-
eralized (no) Killing definition of change agrees with the Hamiltonian definition, as advertised in the
title.
5.3 Lie Derivative from Gauge Generator with Matter Field
One also wants to be able to implement coordinate transformations in the Hamiltonian formalism, at
least using the Hamiltonian equations of motion and constraints as needed. With a matter field φ
present, one needs to think about what the new gauge generator G is. Fortunately one needn’t think
for long (c.f. (Castellani, 1982)). There are no new constraints for this very simple matter theory—
a feature that wouldn’t hold for electromagnetism as the source for gravity, for example. The gauge
generator depends on the primary constraint and the secondary constraint. The primary is just as before.
The secondary constraint gets a new term, but, crucially, the Poisson bracket ‘algebra’ is unchanged
(Sundermeyer, 1982). Hence one only needs to introduce the modified secondary constraint H0 +H0φ in
place of H0. The result is
G = ǫ⊥(H0 +H0φ) + pǫ˙⊥. (38)
One finds that the matter-inclusive gauge generator G has the following Poisson brackets with the
canonical variables (re-expressed using ξ0 once outside the Poisson bracket):
{hij , G} = ξ0{hij ,Hp},
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{πij , G} = ξ0{πij ,Hp},
{N,G} = ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N,
{p,G} = 0 (39)
as before, and now also
{φ,G} = ξ0{φ,Hp},
{πφ, G} = ξ0{πφ,Hp}. (40)
Using Hamilton’s equations, one has
{hij , G} = ξ0h˙ij ,
{πij , G} = ξ0π˙ij ,
{N,G} = ξ0N˙ + ξ˙0N,
{p,G} = 0,
{φ,G} = ξ0φ˙,
{πφ, G} = ξ0π˙φ. (41)
Excluding p, which at least stays 0, all equations match the Lie derivative formulas appropriate given the
transformation properties of the quantities under small change of time coordinate (respectively, scalar,
scalar, weight 1 density, weight −1 density for p, scalar, and scalar). Hence with a massive scalar field
present, the gauge generator G does what is expected in this homogeneously truncated stub of General
Relativity. The Hamiltonian definition of change, in addition to being equivalent to the differential
geometric definition of change, can be expressed in the differential geometric way using distinctively
Hamiltonian resources, which is quite satisfying.
5.4 Problem of Space and Many-Fingered Time
To complete the analysis for GR, one would need, of course, to restore spatial dependence. While the
lack of temporal change in Hamiltonian observables is particularly (in)famous, there is an analogous
problem of space, namely, observables are spatially constant as well (Torre, 1993). Given the relativity
of simultaneity, indeed the many-fingered nature of time in GR, temporal change and spatial variation
are not naturally separated, except insofar as the Hamiltonian formalism forces the distinction to be
made.
Fortunately, the answer to the problem of space (missing spatial variation) should be analogous to
the problem of time. Instead of using the gauge generator for transformations normal to the simultaneity
slices (18), one would use the gauge generator for transformations within the slices (19). The problem
of spatially constant observables, like the problem of temporally constant observables, comes from two
errors. First, often there is a failure to maintain equivalence to 4-dimensional differential geometry
by failing to treat the 00 and 0i components of the metric (or the lapse and shift) and their conjugate
momenta correctly (or by omitting them altogether). Correcting that mistake will yield essential variation
with spatial coordinates just in case there are not a suitable number of independent space-like Killing
vector fields. Because the Hamiltonian formalism is explicitly spatially covariant, the Hamiltonian version
of the story is not very different from the usual differential geometric version, apart from keeping track
of the 3 + 1 split of 4-dimensional equations for Lie derivatives.
To get spatial variation in observables, one needs to attend to the difference between external and
internal gauge symmetries and recognize that demanding 0 Poisson bracket of observables with the spatial
gauge generator (interpreted passively) is the spatial analog of requiring that observables the same at 1 am
Eastern Daylight Time and 1 am Eastern Standard Time (an hour later). The gauge generator generates
the Lie derivative, which is a transport term that compares two differential space-time points with the
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same coordinate values in different coordinate systems; that transport term makes all the difference for
physical interpretation. Hence a physically reasonable definition of observables permits spatial variation
in just the way that temporal change is permitted.
To get spatio-temporal variation, one uses the full gauge generator, that is, the normal and spatial
generators together, with arbitrary descriptor functions (basically a space-time vector field) depending
on both space and time. Or one might even forego the 3 + 1 split altogether if one has a taste for
difficult calculations (Anderson and Bergmann, 1951; Kiriushcheva et al., 2008). I do not anticipate any
difficulty on this point, but I will not explicitly carry out the outlined steps here.
5.5 Including More General Matter
One would also want to include more general matter fields, including electromagnetism (which intro-
duces first-class constraints unrelated to GR’s), Yang-Mills fields (which add to electromagnetism the
complexity of a gauge-covariant rather than gauge-invariant field strength and so more obviously require
reckoning with the gauge freedom of the potentials), massive Proca electromagnetism (which has second-
class rather than first-class constraints, with nontrivial implications for the gauge generator), and spinor
fields, concerning which the ideas of gauge symmetry and Lie differentiation have a large and conflicted
literature (Pitts, 2012). In cases where an additional gauge freedom enters, the arguments akin to those
above might involve an additional quantification over gauges. To pursue all such matters now would start
to submerge the conceptual points about change in GR amidst a longer and more technical discussion.
I expect to address such matters on another occasion, but no particular difficulty seems likely.
6 Phase Space-Time and Clarity in Eight Easy Steps
An issue that arises novelly for General Relativity (with no electromagnetic analog) is that while
Hamiltonian techniques are typically applied to phase space, for General Relativity and other the-
ories with velocity-dependent gauge transformations one should use phase space extended by time
(Marmo et al., 1983; Sugano et al., 1985; Sugano et al., 1986; Lusanna, 1990)—one might call it phase
space-time. In General Relativity, gauge transformations take the form
£ξgµν ∼ ξ0g˙µν + . . . ,
which expression is velocity-dependent. Hence it is no surprise that something goes wrong in treating
GR on phase space. Some authors even use a histories formalism for General Relativity, thereby giving
space-time rather than space a still more prominent role (Savvidou, 2004; Kouletsis, 2000)—though one
might hope for a milder revision of the standard phase space formalism with basically the usual Poisson
brackets.
Clarity about time evolution in Hamiltonian GR is achieved in eight easy steps that yield Hamiltonian-
Lagrangian equivalence:
1. Remove the unclarity induced by active diffeomorphisms (which one would have discarded eventu-
ally anyway via equivalence classes) in favor of passive coordinate transformations.
2. Define geometric objects in terms of both coordinates xµ, xν′, and physically individuated points
p instead of just xµ, xν′.
3. Extend the phase space by x0 in view of the velocity-dependent character of the gauge transforma-
tions, obtaining phase space-time.
4. Restore the lapse and shift vector to recover the space-time metric, not just the spatial metric.
5. Require proper coordinate transformation behavior for the lapse and shift vector somehow or other.
6. Recognize that a first-class constraint does not generate a gauge transformation in GR because it
violates physical equivalence and physical law (c.f. 4-dimensional differential geometry).
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7. Restore the canonical momenta p, pi conjugate to the lapse and shift vector to the phase space(-
time).
8. Implement 4-dimensional coordinate transformations (at least on-shell) by Poisson bracket with G,
obtaining 4-dimensional Lie differentiation for solutions of field equations.
Then no confusion remains (except maybe in observables, which I postpone for another occasion). Rather
than striving to acquiesce in the mysteries supposedly disclosed by Hamiltonian GR, one can clear them
up. Given that such mysteries do not appear in Lagrangian GR, they must be defects in the typical
Hamiltonian formalism rather than features of GR. Time evolution in GR is intricate and in some respects
novel, but not bizarre or mysterious—much as with gravitational energy localization (Pitts, 2010).
One can now see why discussions of reduced phase space for GR have been problematic. The velocity-
dependent character of foliation-changing coordinate transformations implies that phase space-time, not
phase space, is the proper arena in which to work. There just isn’t room in phase space to wander off
into the future or the past. It is thus unclear what it would be to construct a reduced phase space for
GR (The´bault, 2012b) (c.f. the description of the process in ((Belot and Earman, 2001))). Both the
original phase space-time and the reduction process need, so to speak, to reach out into the future (and
past) in a way that is disanalogous to simpler theories. Additional difficulty in constructing a (fully)
reduced phase space(-time) for GR arises from the fact, encountered in detail above, that the Hamiltonian
formalism implements the equivalent of time-involving coordinate transformations only for solutions of the
equations of motion. Hence the usual expectation of constructing a space where antecedently recognizably
physically equivalent gauge-related configurations that might not be solutions of the equations of motion
have been identified as one point, and then formulating dynamics on it, apparently cannot be realized in
the usual way.
7 Relation to Supposedly Timeless Interpretations of GR
In view of the claims about the elimination of time that one sometimes encounters in the physics literature,
one might wonder about the relation of such claims to the results above finding real change. I will take
two examples, Rovelli and Barbour.6 It will appear that their similar rhetoric corresponds to rather
different claims. My views tend to agree with Rovelli’s on many points, whereas I have reservations
about Barbour’s reliance on the Baierlein-Sharp-Wheeler Lagrangian density for GR.
7.1 Rovelli on Time, Space-time, and (Partial) Observables
Rovelli’s work tends to appear with a rhetorical flourish suggestive of distinctive and dramatic claims.
One is urged to “Forget Time” (Rovelli, 2011) and to complete the “unfinished revolution” of GR in
quantization (Rovelli, 2004, p. 3), for example. Many of Rovelli’s rhetorically dramatic points and
innovations amount, on further inspection, to stone-cold-sober observations about the need to maintain
equivalence to Lagrangian GR in the face of entrenched habits of violating it in the canonical-focussed
quantum gravity community. Hence my conclusions actually substantially overlap in both substance and
motivation with Rovelli’s. I will paint with a broad brush, leaving room for further elaboration elsewhere
on some points.
Forgetting time, as practiced by Rovelli, seems to mean, at least in part, “remember space-time.”
If one attempts to formulate GR on phase space (not phase space-time) as if often done, then one has
in effect forgotten time by singling it out and then dropping it altogether. Why think that a theory of
space-time could be formulated without time as part of the mathematical space? By contrast, Rovelli’s
vision of forgetting time prohibits singling time out. Such a vision forbids both including time on special
footing (which seems to be the main advertised target) and singling time out and then dropping it
6I thank an anonymous referee for a question prompting this section.
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(which often happens). What he motivates with picturesque rhetoric is largely what has been urged
above (Marmo et al., 1983; Sugano et al., 1985; Sugano et al., 1986; Lusanna, 1990) on such nuts-and-
bolts mathematical grounds as velocity-dependent gauge transformations in GR.
Whether one engages in the GR-advocacy of completing its “unfinished revolution” in quantization
or not, it does seem evident that quantization of GR will be effected better, if more of the distinctive
classical features of GR are preserved under quantization. Demanding of any canonical quantization
program that it be based upon a classical Hamiltonian formalism equivalent to the Lagrangian (apart
from inevitable topological issues) is one important means to that end, at least if canonical quantization
is worth trying (as it surely is). Hence completing the unfinished revolution of GR seems to mean, at
least in part, that one should preserve Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence while using a Hamiltonian
and contemplating quantization.
Regarding observables, Rovelli has found the traditional notion of observables sufficiently unwieldy
to use as to develop a weaker notion of “partial observables.” He emphasizes physical/relational point
individuation, as opposed to the primitive individuation introduced in modern-style differential geometry
(Rovelli, 1991; Rovelli, 2002b). “General relativistic systems are formulated in terms of variables. . . that
evolve with respect to each other. General relativity expresses relations between these, but in general
we cannot solve for one in terms of the others. Partial observables are genuinely on the same footing.”
(Rovelli, 2002b). Coordinates can be eliminated from observations (Rovelli, 2002a). One needs 5 scalar
fields in order to observe 1, because 4 are used up in identifying the relevant space-time points by
inversion. Traditionally, such considerations were already implemented in classical differential geometry
by its avoidance of primitive point individuation (suited to Einstein’s point-coincidence argument) and its
relativization of physical quantities to a set of arbitrary conventions for labeling space-time (coordinates).
Alternatively, one could use invariant but non-numerical tensors-in-themselves g = gµνdx
µ ⊗ dxν as
operators waiting to give a number relative to a basis; then one needs to reckon with the fact that
physics has traditionally been set up for numerical entities and take appropriate measures. Rovelli’s
partial observables bear a strong resemblance to what observables always should have been in Hamiltonian
GR, and what they implicitly were in Lagrangian GR.
In short, much of Rovelli’s project involves understanding GR correctly in the face of inadequate
efforts to do so. Many of his key themes are quite helpful for uncovering real change—at least B-series
change, different properties at different times—in GR.
7.2 Barbour’s Timelessness of GR and the Fragile BSW Action
Barbour has long argued for the elimination of time from GR (Barbour, 1994a; Barbour, 1994b). A
cornerstone of his interpretation is the possibility of eliminating the lapse N from the action on GR, as
performed long ago by Baierlein, Sharp and Wheeler (BSW) (Baierlein et al., 1962). Noting the fragility
of the BSW procedure gives one pause about relying too heavily on it for conceptual purposes.
Barbour’s claims are both bold (in content and form) and BSW-dependent. In the second paper
he writes about the first: “I have demonstrated that there is a precise sense in which classical general
relativity (GR) is timeless and frameless.” He continues a few pages later:
Indeed, the dilemma in quantum gravity is to decide whether classical GR’s remarkable four-
dimensionality (hitherto regarded as its defining characteristic) is more fundamental than
the structure of geometrodynamics as a timeless theory in a relative configuration space ([1],
section 14). General relativity is like a Shakespearian drama with subplot so prominent one
might confuse it with the main plot. Is Gloucester more than Lear? Is foliation invariance,
the substance of spacetime, more than ephemeris time and intrinsic equilocality?
My answer is the BSW Lagrangian (35) of [1]. I believe this is a deeper expression of what
GR is about than the original Hilbert-Einstein 4-action, since it is so economic with basic
variables: no lapse, the shift is an auxiliary equilocality shuffler. . . .
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The BSW Lagrangian exhibits a structural hierarchy: without the square root and the equilo-
cality shuffler it all dissolves. They are the dynamical framework of GR.. . . Foliation invariance
is the subplot. (Barbour, 1994b, p. 2878).
With so much interpretive weight resting on the BSW Lagrangian for GR, one should attend to how
generally it exists. The BSW elimination of N happens at the Lagrangian level, where the velocities h˙ij ,
not any canonical momenta, are present. Whether a quantity (such as N) is an auxiliary field—whether
it enters the action in an essentially nonlinear and algebraic way, in the simplest case, though one might
tolerate spatial derivatives—depends on what the other quantities in the problem are. Hence N appears
nonlinearly in the Lagrangian formulation (where the 3-metric hij and its velocity appear), but linearly
in the Hamiltonian (where the 3-metric and its canonical momentum appear): the transition from the
velocity to the momentum has swallowed up some of the N-dependence due to the N-dependent relation
between πij and h˙ij (Misner et al., 1973; Wald, 1984). Hence a simple statement that the lapse is (or
isn’t) an auxiliary field is ill-defined without more context. But the dependence on N in the Lagrangian
density is indeed essentially nonlinear and algebraic:
L =
√
h
4N
(hachbd − habhcd)h˙abh˙cd +N
√
hR + . . . , (42)
where the omitted terms involve the shift vector and R is the spatial Ricci scalar (Misner et al., 1973;
Wald, 1984). BSW eliminate N by solving ∂L
∂N
= 0 for N . Continuing to omit the terms with the shift for
simplicity, one has
√
hR = N−2
√
h
4
(hachbd − habhcd)h˙abh˙cd, which can be solved for N2 only if R 6= 0.
But what if R = 0? Then one cannot solve for N ; BSW’s equation 7 cannot be obtained. Purely inverse
quadratic dependence on N in ∂L
∂N
(with no N0 term) makes N in effect a Lagrange multiplier (linear
dependence on N−2), not an auxiliary field (essentially nonlinear and hence soluble dependence on N).
Something bad happens at moments of time symmetry as well, such as if an expanding universe stopped
and started contracting: N disappears from ∂L
∂N
= 0. Whereas my treatment of Bianchi I cosmological
models preserves most of the relevant features of GR (apart from many-fingered time) and has no difficulty
finding time and change, the BSW lapse-elimination on which Barbour’s time-eliminating interpretation
is not even available. It seems perhaps unwise to place too much reliance on a manipulation that does not
always work. At any rate the fragility of the BSW procedure makes Barbour’s interpretation involving
the elimination of time less than compelling.
Furthermore, one might wish to formulate GR in a way that doesn’t exclude in advance any possibility
of perturbative treatment. One can then ascertain which features of the theory exist even without
interactions (the limit as Newton’s G vanishes), and which depend on interactions. To that end one can
make a perturbation-friendly change of variables, which includes splitting off the “vacuum expectation
values”: hij = δij +
√
32πGγij , N = 1 +
√
32πGn and rewriting using γij (at least in derivatives) and
n. In the process one also gives up the now-usual unphysical normalization of the ADM Lagrangian
(Misner et al., 1973, p. 520) in favor of the physically standard normalization L = 1
2
γ˙2ij . . .. Applying
the well-known possibility of splitting the weight 1 Ricci scalar density to three dimensions (
√
hR =
3ΓΓ + div), suppressing all terms involving the shift, and dropping all terms independent of n, one has
these essential BSW-related terms in L pertaining to the possibility of eliminating N by its equation of
motion:
n · div√
8πG︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(
√
G
0
)
+n
(
3ΓΓ√
8πG
−
√
8πGhγ˙abγ˙cd(h
achbd − habhcd)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(
√
G)
+n216πG
√
hγ˙abγ˙cd(h
achbd − habhcd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(
√
G
2
)
− . . . .
(43)
One now sees an additional sense in which the BSW elimination of N is fragile: it works not at zeroth
order in the coupling constant
√
32πG (the free or linearized theory), nor even at first interacting order
in
√
32πG, but finally at second interacting order O(
√
G
2
) before one can even solve at all for N—to say
nothing of solving and getting anything at least approximating the perturbation-unfriendly BSW answer!
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At zeroth order in
√
G, n is a Lagrange multiplier implying a Poisson-like constraint equation. At first
order in
√
G (which is still linear in n), n is a Lagrange multiplier for a constraint equation expanded
to include energy terms. Finally at second order in
√
G, which is the lowest order in which n2 appears,
one can vary n for an equation that can be solved for n, which is essential to the BSW trick. If one
solves that equation for n, one still doesn’t get anything like the ‘right’ BSW answer for n and hence N ,
however. The same should hold at higher orders n3, n4, n5 (soon leaving the realm where the equation
can be solved in closed form as one gets a quintic polynominal), etc. One has to work to all orders and
then reverse the geometric series expansion. Hence the BSW lapse elimination depends as strongly as
it possibly could on interaction terms. Related points were made prior to BSW by Peres and Rosen
(Peres and Rosen, 1959). It is unusual for the essence of a theory to be completely absent in the two
lowest order terms (which already account for much of the theory’s empirical success), and then have a
sequence of partly mistaken essences for every higher perturbative order (which will quickly account for
any remaining empirical confirmation (Blanchet, 1992)), with the true essence becoming appearing only
nonperturbatively (and far transcending empirical test). One might see this fact as reason to wonder
whether the BSW action really uncovers the essence of GR. Because all of our evidence for GR requires
less than exact nonperturbative treatment, that evidence would fit rival theories that approximate GR
to some high order in
√
G but not all orders, and which therefore lack the true BSW essence of GR.
Whereas Barbour has wanted to see how empty the glass of time in GR is, I find it reasonable to
view the glass as mostly full. To that end his doubts about aspects of the usual meanings attributed to
first-class constraints are useful (Barbour and Foster, 2008).
8 Resolution of Earman-Maudlin Standoff
Successfully finding change in Hamiltonian GR resolves the standoff between Earman and Maudlin
(Earman, 2002; Maudlin, 2002). Earman invoked Hamiltonian GR and inferred no real change (more or
less—one is left contending with a neologistic “D series” in the spirit of McTaggart and delving into the
philosophy of mind), whereas Maudlin invoked common sense’s real change and rejected Hamiltonian
GR. Earman’s enthusiasm for Hamiltonian GR is not misplaced, but various errors commonly found
in the physics literature needed to be corrected. Earman’s mere “surface structure” of tensor calculus
and the presence or absence of Killing vector fields in fact provided the key: it gives same answer as
the corrected Hamiltonian treatment. His “deep structure” is erroneous in ways that I discuss here, the
prequel (Pitts, 2013) and its GR-oriented companion (in preparation (Pitts, 2014a)), and the sequel on
observables (Pitts, 2014b). Maudlin’s common-sense detection of change is vindicated, but his dismissal
of the Hamiltonian formalism isn’t. Instead a Lagrangian-guided reform of the Hamiltonian formalism
has been achieved, the continuing need for which (extending conceptually what Mukunda, Castellani,
Sugano, Kimura, Pons, Salisbury, Shepley, Sundermeyer and a few others have done technically) might
not yet have been recognized without Maudlin’s critique.
Of course requiring that the Hamiltonian formalism agree with the Lagrangian formalism simply
had to work. Change in Hamiltonian GR is neither distinctively canonical nor problematic, at any rate
not classically. Presumably there are quantum consequences, but I do not attempt here to say what
they are. It might be that resolving problems in classical canonical GR simultaneously loosens the pre-
sumed connections between classical and quantum canonical GR that Bergmann expected. Enforcing
the equivalence of the unclear constrained Hamiltonian formalism with the clear Lagrangian formalism is
evident in early works by Bergmann and collaborators (e.g., (Anderson and Bergmann, 1951)). Eventu-
ally Bergmann took shortcuts about observables, as Dirac did about gauge transformations and even the
size of the phase space. Recovering Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence removes confusion. Real change
has been found without delving much into the “observables” thicket, though addressing such issues in a
Lagrangian-equivalent way can bring additional clarity (Pitts, 2014b).
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9 Philosophical Accounts of Time and Change in GR
There isn’t any conceptual difficulty in locating change in General Relativity, either in the Lagrangian
formalism or in the Hamiltonian formalism, once the latter is set up properly. The former claim is
fairly widely accepted. The latter differs from widely shared views among philosophers (Belot, 2007;
Belot and Earman, 2001; Belot and Earman, 1999; Huggett et al., 2013; Rickles, 2006), where the idea
that a first-class constraint generates a gauge transformation has been widely influential.
Demanding and successfully achieving a Hamiltonian formalism equivalent to the Lagrangian one
will ensure that change is equally discernible both places. But much of the conceptual reflection on
GR and much of the effort to quantize it canonically have been carried out with Hamiltonian formal-
ism(s) inequivalent to the Lagrangian. A main root of the difficulty is the doctrine that a first-class
constraint generates a gauge transformation. That doctrine, widely assumed by high authorities in theo-
retical/mathematical physics (Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992; Gotay et al., 1978) and already apparent
in the work of Dirac and Bergmann in the 1950s (but not in ((Anderson and Bergmann, 1951)), which
employs G), is nonetheless readily falsifiable by direct calculation using the example of electromagnetism
(Pitts, 2013). This doctrine is often associated with the extended Hamiltonian, Dirac’s idea that one
may add all the first-class constraints (not just first-class primary constraints) to the Hamiltonian with
arbitrary coefficients, and needs to do so to exhibit the full gauge freedom (Dirac, 1964). Instead, a
gauge transformation is actually generated by a special combination of first-class constraints, the gauge
generator G of Anderson and Bergmann, which disappeared for about 30 years and started resurfac-
ing slowly in the 1980s (Mukunda, 1980; Castellani, 1982; Sugano et al., 1986; Gra`cia and Pons, 1988;
Sugano et al., 1992; Pons et al., 1997; Shepley et al., 2000; Pons and Salisbury, 2005). The gauge gen-
erator G is associated with the primary Hamiltonian, which adds to the canonical Hamiltonian only
the primary first-class constraints. The primary Hamiltonian is equivalent to the Lagrangian, whereas
the extended Hamiltonian is not. Proponents of the extended Hamiltonian claim that it is equiva-
lent to the Lagrangian for observable quantities, the difference being additional extra gauge freedom
(Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992). That turns out not to be the case once one is clear about primor-
dial observables vs. auxiliary fields like canonical momenta (Pitts, 2013). The canonical momentum
conjugate to Ai, far from being the primordial observable electric field as is sometimes claimed, is just
an auxiliary field that one can integrate out using its algebraic equation of motion due to its nonlinear
algebraic appearance in the Hamiltonian action S =
∫
dtd3x(pq˙−H). By such moves one thereby recovers
the Lagrangian action
∫
dtd3xL, which gets by just fine without the conjugate momenta. Ai and A0
are what couple to current and charge densities, so they (through a gauge-invariant combination of their
derivatives (Jackson, 1975)) constitute the primordial observable electric field.
9.1 Comparison to Belot and Earman
Belot and Earman’s treatments, being especially thorough, early and influential, will repay detailed
attention. One should note that, at least on technical grounds, Earman is perhaps of two minds, assuming
that a first class constraint generates a gauge transformation, but also briefly exhibiting the gauge
generator (Earman, 2003). But the former view is clearly dominant in his work.
It appears that the difference between my conclusions about the ease of finding change in GR and
Belot’s conclusions about the difficulty of finding change in GR are caused largely by the divide between
my adopting the Lagrangian-equivalent primary Hamiltonian and the specially tuned sum of first-class
constraints G as generating gauge transformations on the one hand, and Belot’s and Earman’s adopting
the Lagrangian-inequivalent extended Hamiltonian and an arbitrary sum of first-class constraints as
generating gauge transformations on the other (Belot and Earman, 2001).7
While much of the difficulty in finding change arises in Hamiltonian treatments, Belot finds difficulty
7 I thank Oliver Pooley for very helpful discussion on this matter.
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already at the Lagrangian level (Belot, 2007, p. 172), presumed to be due to the inclusion of unphysical
variables. “The remedy is reduction — the reduced space of solutions and the reduced space of initial
data are symplectic and isomorphic.” While there is some sense in which reduction in the loose sense of
looking for a small nice thing related to a large messy thing perhaps needs to be the answer, constructing
a new smaller and more abstract space is not the only option. An alternative, as was displayed above, is
to work in terms of a specific solution (or, for that matter, a solution and all its gauge-transforms) and
apply a gauge-invariant test for the existence of a special gauge (in vacuum GR, a coordinate system)
in which time dependence is absent. One does not need to find that coordinate system in advance of
recognizing its specialness; indeed one does not need to find it at all (if it exists). One only needs to
ascertain whether the Killing equation £ξgµν = 0 has a solution for a time-like vector field ξ
µ, a gauge-
invariant statement (true in all coordinate systems), to learn whether the metric lacks change. Likewise
for matter, at least assuming that the matter fields are geometric objects and do not have additional
gauge groups (hence there are further technical complications for GR + electromagnetism or GR +
spinors). If neither the metric nor any matter changes, then there is no change; if something changes,
then there is change. This is a straightforward question of classical tensor calculus, requiring none of the
sophistication involved in reduction. In effect one ascertains whether one could gauge-fix with a certain
result, without actually gauge-fixing. The test for change is local—there can be a time-like Killing
vector in some places but not others (witness the Schwarzschild solution) and hence does not require the
distinction between cosmological and asymptotically flat solutions. The use of a gauge-invariant test for
a ‘good’ gauge requires the use of quantifiers, as appeared above.
Many of Belot’s remaining difficulties relevant to the Lagrangian formalism are consequences of seek-
ing Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence from the wrong end—that is, accepting widely asserted features
of the Hamiltonian formalism as true and expecting the Lagrangian to match, rather than asking that
the Hamiltonian match the more perspicuous Lagrangian. Some of these supposed features have to do
with constrained Hamiltonian theories with first-class constraints in general, such as too broad a view of
what generates a gauge transformation. Others have to do with peculiarities of GR, for which the gauge
symmetry is external (motivating covariance rather than invariance), the gauge transformations normal
to the simultaneity hypersurface only relate physically equivalent and physically meaningful states on-
shell (using equations of motion) because H0 is quadratic in momenta (Fradkin and Vilkovisky, 1977;
Castellani, 1982; Mukhanov and Wipf, 1995), the velocity dependence of the gauge transformations ne-
cessitates extending phase space by time, etc.. The very phrase “reduced phase space” has erroneous
presuppositions. It is also by no means clear (c.f. p. 211) that Lagrangian quantization ought to proceed
in terms of true degrees of freedom—witness the vast and sophisticated literature for quantization of GR
that leaves the gauge freedom in.
Before delving into the challenges of canonical GR, it is advisable to look at the standard test bed
theory, Maxwell’s electromagnetism, as presented in Belot’s version of a constrained Hamiltonian for-
malism (Belot, 1998; Belot, 2003). One first notices the omission not merely of the canonical momentum
p0 conjugate to the scalar potential A0 (which is common enough and not automatically disastrous),
but also the omission of A0 itself, from the formulation. Is this elimination achieved by gauge fixing
A0 = 0 via the Dirac bracket, the usual gauge-fixing technology of Dirac-Bergmann constrained dy-
namics (Sundermeyer, 1982)? Such a formalism would be possible, though not trivial; e.g., what is the
canonical generator of whatever gauge transformations might remain (Mukunda, 1980)? It would be
awkward to couple Belot’s Hamiltonian electromagnetism to charge without A0, because A0ρ is the stan-
dard interaction term with charge density. But difficulties exist even for the vacuum case. One dilemma
pertains to the origin of the Gauss-like constraint ∇ · ~E = 0. (I have here employed Belot’s notation of
using E for the canonical momentum. Such a notation in fact is a temptation to conflate entities that
are quite distinct in their gauge transformation properties, F0i (a familiar function of derivatives of Aµ)
and the canonical momentum. These quantities are in fact not even related until one uses the equations
of motion: p is independent of q˙. That is why I called the constraint Gauss-like.) The Hamiltonian is
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given as (simplifying to flat space and Cartesian coordinates for simplicity)∫
d3x
1
2
( ~E · ~E + |∇ × ~A|2).
Now one faces a dilemma. If the condition ∇· ~E = 0 is not employed in the variational principle, then
how does it arise later? Note that gauge-fixing A0 = 0 in the usual treatment would require that any
lingering gauge transformations be time-independent in view of the usual gauge freedom δAµ = −∂µǫ.
Thus Belot’s notation Λ(t) is misleading in implying time dependence of the descriptor Λ (basically my
−ǫ). Note also that, in contrast to the more usual formulation of electromagnetism that includes A0,
Belot’s alleged gauge transformation descriptor Λ doesn’t cancel out of the Maxwell equation A˙ = − ~E
under the alleged gauge transformation ~A → ~A + ∇Λ—not unless one discards the advertised time
dependence (or the spatial dependence) of Λ(t) (called g(t) in the later paper). One also spoils the
Gauss-like law ∇ · ~E = 0 unless ∇2g˙ = 0. Without time-dependent arbitrary functions, by definition
there is no gauge freedom. Thus there actually is no gauge freedom in Belot’s formulation, and no threat
of indeterminism.
On the other hand, suppose that ∇ · ~E = 0 is imposed secretly in the variational principle. That
would explain why the constraint exists later. But there is a cost in the variational principle, which must
make use of a transverse-longitudinal decomposition (e.g., (Deser, 1972; Marzban et al., 1989)). Then
one gets not ~˙A = − ~E, but only its transverse part
∂
∂t
(
~A− ∇(∇ ·
~A)
∇2
)
= − ~E :
the gradient part is projected away, leaving only what is spatially divergenceless. This expression is per-
haps most readily motivated using spatial Fourier transformations, and can also be understood in terms
of Green’s functions. This transverse projection ensures that ∇Λ, the supposed gauge transformation, is
immediately eliminated by the projection operation. Resorting to Fourier space or inverting a differential
operator using a Green’s function is of course a spatially nonlocal operation. Such a blatant threat to
locality will pose grave difficulties for the project of understanding senses of locality, the Aharonov-Bohm
effect, etc. later in the papers.
Turning to Belot’s article on time and change in mechanics generally and in GR in particular, one
finds that section 3.3 (Belot, 2007) on presymplectic manifolds presents a collection of stipulative def-
initions, some of them about familiar words like “gauge,” some of them less familiar like “presymplec-
tic”: “We call,” “We define,” etc. While clearly the definitions of long-familiar words are intended
to be roughly equivalent to more traditional ones like Aµ → Aµ − ∂µǫ(t, x) (Belot, 2007, p. 189),
that equivalence is not shown—not there, and not successfully elsewhere (e.g. (Gotay et al., 1978;
Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992)) either. Beneath the surface, evidently, is the doctrine that a first-
class constraint generates a gauge transformation (Belot and Earman, 2001)—which, alas, isn’t true
(Pitts, 2013). Gauge transformations for electromagnetism make sense “off-shell” (without using any of
Hamilton’s equations), and there just isn’t any relationship at all between the canonical momentum and
the electric field (a function of derivatives of Aµ—the field that couples to charge density in the term
AµJ µ) in that context. Hence preserving the magnetic field (the curl of the 3-vector Am) and the canon-
ical momentum, Belot’s necessary and sufficient conditions for physical equivalence (Belot, 2007, p. 189),
is necessary but not sufficient. One also needs to preserve the electric field, which equals the canonical
momenta (up to a sign) only on-shell via q˙ = δH
δp
. (Belot and Earman also present the electric field
as though it were itself the canonical momenta (Belot and Earman, 2001).) That equality is spoiled by
arbitrary combinations of first-class constraints; it is preserved only by the specially tuned combination
G. Indeed one can derive the form of G by requiring that the change in the electric field from the primary
constraint and the change in the electric field from the secondary straight cancel out (Pitts, 2013). The
relation between the canonical momentum and the electric field comes from calculating a Poisson bracket
and so cannot be used inside another Poisson bracket (such as in calculating a gauge transformation).
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Turning to General Relativity itself, one finds both analogs of the issues for electromagnetism and
new ones. One issue that becomes important is whether one uses active diffeomorphisms (as Belot does)
or passive coordinate transformations. Active diffeomorphisms presuppose that space-time points are
individuated mathematically independently of what happens there. But the lesson of Einstein’s point-
coincidence argument seems to be that space-time points are individuated physically by virtue of what
happens there (Hoefer, 1996). It seems to start off on the wrong foot to presuppose a mathematical
formalism ill-adapted to the lessons of Einstein’s point-coincidence argument by individuating space-
time points primitively for mathematical purposes, and then to repudiate the physical meaning of that
individuation. That curious piece of mathematical metaphysics lacks two merits of coordinate systems,
namely, being descriptively rich enough to do tensor calculus, and being manifestly just one of many
equally good options and hence less tempting to take with undue seriousness. Geographers and classical
differential geometers have rules for changing coordinate systems, but it seems awkward to change names
of individuals, or to introduce individuals and then annihilate or conflate them. Clarity about passive
coordinate transformations will play a role below in identifying gauge transformations and hence gauge-
invariant quantities.
A second issue that arises novelly for General Relativity, as noted above, is the velocity-dependent
gauge transformations and consequent need to use phase space extended by time. While one can attempt
to carry over to GR a reduced phase space construction that works for theories with internal velocity-
independent transformations (Belot and Earman, 2001), the results are very unlikely to mean what one
hoped. This fact relates to the admission elsewhere in the paper that it isn’t obvious how changes of
time coordinate are implemented in their formalism (Belot and Earman, 2001). Indeed when one does
implement changes of time coordinate (as discussed above), one doesn’t know which points in phase
space-time are physically equivalent under the gauge transformations that (on-shell!) change the time
coordinate until after the equations of motion are used. Hence the usual idea of reduced phase space
as implementing dynamics on a space where physically equivalent gauge-related descriptions have been
identified in advance is impossible. One would therefore need to rethink reduced phase space-time from
the ground up for GR, as far as changes of time coordinate are concerned, before philosophizing about
it.
A third issue involves what to do with the less interesting field components and their momenta.
Although Belot now keeps the electric scalar potential A0 (in contrast to (Belot, 1998)), for GR he gives
short shrift to the lapse and the shift vector, the 40% of the space-time metric by which it transcends the
spatial metric. He apparently discards the lapse and shift in choosing a Gaussian slicing (Belot, 2007,
p. 201). Belot and Earman discard the electric scalar potential and claim to follow Beig (Beig, 1994)
in eliminating the lapse and shift (Belot and Earman, 2001). For Beig that means only keeping them as
freely prescribed functions of space and time without the Hamiltonian apparatus of canonical momenta
and Hamilton’s equations; it might mean something stronger for Belot and Earman. Losing some of the
q’s, besides leaving one unable to infer the space-time metric, makes it well-nigh impossible to express
4-dimensional coordinate transformations.
To discuss further points at issue particularly in GR, it is best to quote the end of p. 201 and much
of p. 202 for contrast.
The gauge orbits of [the presymplectic form] ω have the following structure: initial data sets
(q, π) and (q′, π′) belong to the same gauge orbit if and only if they arise as initial data for
the same solution g.[Footnote suppressed]
2. Construct a Hamiltonian. Application of the usual rule for constructing a Hamiltonian
given a Lagrangian leads to the Hamiltonian h ≡ 0.
3. Construct dynamics. Imposing the usual dynamical equation, according to which the
dynamical trajectories are generated by the vector field(s) Xh solving ω(Xh, ·) = dh, leads to
the conclusion that dynamical trajectories are those curves generated by null vector fields. So
a curve in I [the space of initial data] is a dynamical trajectory if and only if it stays always
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in the same gauge orbit. This is, of course, physically useless – since normally we expect
dynamical trajectories for a theory with gauge symmetries to encode physical information by
passing from gauge orbit to gauge orbit. But in the present case, nothing else could have been
hoped for. A non-zero Hamiltonian would have led to dynamical trajectories which passed
from gauge orbit to gauge orbit – but this would have been physical nonsense (and worse than
useless). For such dynamics would have carried us from an initial state that could be thought
of as an instantaneous state for solution g to a later instantaneous state that could not be
thought of as an instantaneous state for solution g. In doing so, it would have turned out to
encode dynamical information very different from that encoded in Einsteins field equations.
(Belot, 2007, pp. 201, 202)
The claim that the Hamiltonian vanishes identically (also in (Belot and Earman, 1999)) is not correct.
The method for constructing a Hamiltonian in constrained dynamics gives a Hamiltonian that is only
weakly equal to 0 (plus boundary terms, which do not matter) (Sundermeyer, 1982); the gradient is not
0, so Poisson brackets with the Hamiltonian need not be 0. Weak equality is by construction compatible
with non-zero Poisson brackets and hence a non-zero Hamiltonian vector field. Belot and Earman point
to chapter 4 of ((Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992)). There one finds the following:
If the q’s and p’s transform as scalars under reparametrizations, the pq˙-term in the action
transforms as a scalar density, and its time integral is therefore invariant by itself.. . .Thus,
if q and p transform as scalars under time reparametrizations, the Hamiltonian is (weakly)
zero for a generally covariant system. (Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992, pp. 105, 106, italics
in the original, but boldface added)
As appeared above in the flurry of Lie derivatives, the relevant q’s and p’s are scalars under time
reparametrization. (The lapse fits in with Henneaux and Teitelboim’s u’s, which are densities, as is
the lapse.) In GR the Hamiltonian is weakly 0 (apart from possible boundary terms), but it nonetheless
has nonzero Poisson brackets and so is not prohibited from generating real time evolution.
The primary Hamiltonian leads to equations equivalent to Einstein’s equations (Sundermeyer, 1982).
Such dynamics takes one set of initial data to another set of (what one could regard as initial) data
with (typically) different properties—the universe has expanded, for example, or gravitational waves
have propagated, or some such. Change has occurred. Both moments are parts of the same space-time.
Gauge transformations can be divided into purely spatial ones and those changing the time as well.
Purely spatial ones, generated by G[ǫi, ǫ˙i] depending on a spatially projected 3-vector and its velocity,
take each moment under one coordinate description into that same moment under another coordinate
description with the same time coordinate but different spatial coordinates. Coordinate transformations
involving time cannot be implemented on phase space, but live rather on phase space extended by
time, because they are velocity-dependent. Such a gauge transformation, which essentially involves the
normally projected gauge generator G[ǫ, ǫ˙], acts on an entire space-time (trajectory, history) and repaints
coordinate labels onto it (or at any rate acts in that way in the overlap of the two relevant coordinate
charts); the relabeling happens on a 4-dimensional blob, not a 3-dimensional one. Relabeling a space-
time with coordinates leaves one on the same gauge orbit, but that in no way implies the absence of
change. Change is indicated by nonzero Lie derivatives with respect to all time-like vector fields.
The representation of changeable quantities proves to be rather harder for Belot than it is on my
view. He surveys various spaces on which one might try to represent changeable quantities—the space
of solutions, the reduced space of solutions, and the reduced space of initial data (Belot, 2007, pp. 203,
204) and comes up empty every time.
And on the space of initial data we face an unattractive dilemma: if we seek to represent
changeable quantities by non-gauge invariant functions, then we face indeterminism; if we
employ gauge-invariant functions, then we are faced with essentially the same situation we
met in the reduced space of initial data. (Belot, 2007, p. 204)
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At this point it becomes important to employ exclusively passive coordinate transformations in order to
have a clear idea of what gauge-invariance is and hence what the gauge-invariant functions are. Thus
gauge transformations are coordinate transformations. Famously, scalars are coordinate-invariant. Hence
scalars that depend on time exhibit change; an independent set of Weyl curvature scalars to form a co-
ordinate system is one example. Quantities that aren’t scalars (gauge-invariant) might still be geometric
objects (gauge-covariant)—contravariant vectors, covariant vectors, various kinds of tensors, tensor den-
sities, etc., the meat and drink of classical differential geometry (Schouten, 1954; Anderson, 1967). Lie
differentiation is the tool to ascertain time dependence. In cases where (there exists a coordinate system
such that) the metric is independent of time, one has a time-like Killing vector field: there exists a vector
field ξα such that £ξgµν = 0 and ξ
α is time-like. The components gµν are not gauge-invariant, but they
are gauge-covariant, which is good enough. (The metric-in-itself g(p) = gµνdx
µ⊗dxν is gauge-invariant,
but the usual modern definition of Lie derivatives involves active diffeomorphisms; the geometric ob-
ject {gµν} (in all coordinates (Nijenhuis, 1952; Schouten, 1954; Anderson, 1967; Trautman, 1965)) is
also gauge-invariant, but dealing with every coordinate system at once introduces needless complication.
Hence the classical approach of using any arbitrary coordinate system as representative is attractive.) It
makes no difference whether the space-time is spatially closed, asymptotically flat, or neither, because
change is defined locally. Just go to a basement with no windows and watch for change; you won’t have
to look so carefully as to be sensitive to global space-time geometry.
The nexus of the problem of time, as identified by Belot, is related to the space on which one formu-
lates the Hamiltonian dynamics. “This is the nexus of the problem of time: time is not represented in
general relativity by a flow on a symplectic space and change is not represented by functions on a space
of instantaneous or global states.” (Belot, 2007, p. 209 ). But one ought not to try to represent time and
change in GR in phase space; one needs phase space extended by a time coordinate because the gauge
transformations are velocity-dependent (Marmo et al., 1983; Sugano et al., 1986; Sugano et al., 1985;
Lusanna, 1990). To express 4-dimensional coordinate transformations, one also needs the lapse and the
shift vector. If one wishes to generate 4-dimensional coordinate transformations via a Poisson bracket,
then one needs a big Poisson bracket including the canonical momenta conjugate to the lapse and shift—
the momenta that vanish according to the primary constraints. As noted above, it isn’t terribly clear
what has become of the lapse and the shift vector in Belot’s treatment; the quantities that he (like many
authors) mostly discusses are merely the 3-metric and its canonical momentum, giving 12 functions at
each point in space, satisfying 4 constraints H0 = 0 and Hi = 0 at each point in space. When one
restores the lapse and shift vector to include the whole space-time metric and hence a better shot at
expressing coordinate transformations involving time, and restores their conjugate momenta (vanishing
as primary constraints) to improve one’s chances at expressing 4-dimensional coordinate transformations
using Hamiltonian resources, namely the gauge generator G, one gets 20 functions of time at each point
in space, satisfying 8 constraints at each point in space: p = 0, pi = 0, H0 = 0, and Hi = 0 at each
point in space. But to include velocity-dependent gauge transformations (such as change the time slice
in GR), one should also include time in an extended phase space. Hence instead of 12∞3 functions
satisfying 4∞3 constraints and (maybe) changing over a time that isn’t part of the space in question,
one needs 20∞3 quantities satisfying 8∞3 constraints on a slice of a space of 20∞3 + 1 dimensions.
(Admittedly the primary constraints p, pi are 4∞3 quantities with the boring task of being 0 according
to 4∞3 of the constraints.) Such a space admits a Hamiltonian formalism equivalent to the Lagrangian
formalism and hence makes change (or its absence) unproblematic in terms of the absence (or presence,
respectively) of a time-like Killing vector field. Change apparently is not easy to find using reduction (at
least, not using reductions attempted thus far). But it is readily found using the Lagrangian-equivalent
non-reduced phase space including the primary constraints and extended by time, to which one can apply
a gauge-invariant test for the existence of a gauge (coordinate system, in vacuum GR) in which change
is absent.
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9.2 The´bault on Time, Change and Gauge in GR and Elsewhere
Unusually among philosophers, The´bault’s work has expressed at least selective skepticism about whether
a first-class constraint generates a gauge transformation, especially in relation to time and the Hamil-
tonian constraint in theories or formulations that have one (The´bault, 2012a; The´bault, 2012b). Such
skepticism is partly informed by, among other things, views of Kucharˇ, Barbour and Foster’s work, and
of the Lagrangian equivalence-oriented reforms of Pons, Salisbury and Shepley. Clearly such skepticism
could only be bolstered by the recognition that a first-class constraint typically does not generate a gauge
transformation. Then the quick argument from the fact that the Hamiltonian of GR is a sum of first-class
constraints (and a boundary term) to the conclusion that it generates just a pile of gauge transforma-
tions is no longer tempting. When familiar general presumptions about gauge freedom and first-class
constraints disappear, less work is required to motivate taking GR as partly violating those presumptive
conclusions. For example, Kucharˇ’s and The´bault’s exceptional treatment of the Hamiltonian constraint
vis-a-vis the other constraints in GR becomes partly unnecessary, because the other constraints are no
longer viewed as having some of the features that Kucharˇ et al. deny of the Hamiltonian constraint. (Of
course the considerations about reduced phase space-time and the merely on-shell nature of Hamiltonian
coordinate transformations due to the quadratic-in-momenta character of the Hamiltonian constraint im-
ply that there are still some exceptional features of H0, rightly highlighted by The´bault’s doubts about
reduced phase space.) The dual role of the Hamiltonian constraint in relation to both evolution and
gauge transformations (The´bault, 2012b) is clarified when one notices that H0 does neither of these jobs
by itself; both are accomplished by teaming up with other constraints, whether in Hp or in G. These
teaming arrangements are easy enough to see when one retains the lapse, shift vector, and associated
canonical momenta p, pi and associated primary constraints, but impossible to see when one truncates
the phase space in the way common since Dirac (Dirac, 1958; Salisbury, 2006; Salisbury, 2010). The idea
of extending phase space by t in order to accommodate velocity-dependent gauge transformations also
fits well with The´bault’s project. In short, making the constrained Hamiltonian formalism equivalent to
the Lagrangian formalism as far as possible will facilitate drawing various conclusions for which The´bault
has argued on partly different grounds.
10 Quantum Problem of Time from Constraint Imposition
While change in Hamiltonian General Relativity is unproblematic at the classical level, the same does
not hold at the quantum level. In other words, what remains of the problem of time, what actu-
ally exists of the problem, begins at quantization. It is many-faceted (Butterfield and Isham, 1999;
Butterfield and Isham, 2001; Anderson, 2012). The usual Dirac method of imposition of constraints by
requiring that a physical state be annihilated by them seems to close the door to change at the quantum
level in a way with no classical analog (Pons, 2005).
11 Conclusion
Having delved into the Hamiltonian formalism, one finds that, when set up properly, its verdict on change
agrees with that of the condition of having no time-like Killing vector. Earman’s healthy respect for a
constrained Hamiltonian formalism and Maudlin’s healthy respect for common sense and the superiority
of the Lagrangian formalism are reconciled. This is of course no accident: making the Hamiltonian match
the Lagrangian has been the basic policy of reform employed by Pons, Salisbury and Shepley’s series of
works, which I quote again:
We have been guided by the principle that the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formalisms should
be equivalent. . . in coming to the conclusion that they in fact are. (Pons and Shepley, 1998,
p. 17)
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Enforcing the equivalence of the unclear Hamiltonian formalism with the clear Lagrangian formalism
is very evident in the early work of Bergmann’s school—e.g., (Anderson and Bergmann, 1951). But
eventually, perhaps by accident, certain shortcuts were taken, by Bergmann about observables, by Dirac
about gauge transformations, by both about whether the lapse, shift vector, and their canonical mo-
menta should be retained in the phase space (e.g., (Dirac, 1958))—shortcuts yielding ‘insights’ that have
sustained confusion for decades. Recovering Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence has been underway
for some time (Mukunda, 1980; Castellani, 1982; Salisbury and Sundermeyer, 1983; Sugano et al., 1986;
Gra`cia and Pons, 1988). While the gauge generator by now is moderately famous again, it has by no
means swept the field. Furthermore, and more importantly for present purposes, there remains the need
to clear away the conceptual errors generated during the gauge generator’s period of eclipse. This paper
has aimed to do that regarding time evolution. A successor paper is planned to do the same regarding
observables.
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